on the fullest scale was the right of all who were fit to exercise it, and the most satisfactory working solution of political problems.  Therefore the right must be granted; and the unity of the Empire must take care of itself.  No doubt this attitude was more readily adopted because of the widespread belief that in fact the colonies would all sooner or later cut their connection with the mother-country.  But it was fully shared by men who did not hold this view, and who believed strongly in the possibility and desirability of maintaining imperial unity.  It was shared, for example, by Wakefield, a convinced imperialist if ever there was one, and by that great colonial administrator, Sir George Grey.  It was shared by Lord Durham and by Lord John Russell, who were largely responsible for the adoption of the new policy.  Their belief and hope was that the common possession of free institutions of kindred types would in fact form the most effective tie between the lands which enjoyed them.  This hope obtained an eloquent expression in the speech in which, in 1852, Russell introduced the bill for granting to the Australian colonies self-government on such a scale as amounted almost to independence.  It is not true, as is sometimes said, that the self-governing institutions of the colonies were established during this period owing to the indifference of the home authorities, and their readiness to put an end to the connection.  The new policy of these years was deliberately adopted; and although its acceptance by parliament was rendered easier by the prevalence of disbelief in the permanence of the imperial tie, yet, on the part of the responsible men, it was due to far-sighted statesmanship.

The critical test of the new colonial policy, and the most dramatic demonstration of its efficacy, were afforded by Canada, where, during the thirties, the conditions which preceded the revolt of the American colonies were being reproduced with curious exactness.  The self-governing institutions established in the Canadian colonies in 1791 very closely resembled those of the American colonies before the revolution:  they gave to the representative houses control over taxation and legislation, but neither control over, nor responsibility for, the executive.  And the same results were following.  Incomplete self-government was striving after its own fulfilment:  the denial of responsibility was producing irresponsibility.  These was the same unceasing friction between governors and their councils on the one hand, and the representative bodies on the other hand; and the assemblies were showing the same unreasonableness in refusing to meet manifest public obligations.  This state of things was becoming steadily more acute in all the colonies, but it was at its worst in the province of Quebec, where the constitutional friction was embittered by a racial conflict, the executive body being British, while the great majority of the assembly was French; and the conflict was producing a very dangerous alienation