because it alone is developed to such a point that
the problem is inevitably raised. Whatever else
may happen, the war must necessarily bring a crisis
in the history of the British Empire. On a vastly
greater scale the situation of 1763 is being reproduced.
Now, as then, the Empire will emerge from a war for
existence, in which mother and daughter lands alike
have shared. Now, as then, the strain and pressure
of the war will have brought to light deficiencies
in the system of the Empire. Now, as then, the
most patent of these deficiencies will be the fact
that, generous as the self-governing powers of the
great Dominions have been, they still have limits;
and the irresistible tendency of self-government to
work towards its own fulfilment will once more show
itself. For there are two spheres in which even
the most fully self-governing of the empire-nations
have no effective control: they do not share
in the determination of foreign policy, and they do
not share in the direction of imperial defence.
The responsibility for foreign policy, and the responsibility,
and with it almost the whole burden, of organising
imperial defence, have hitherto rested solely with
Britain. Until the Great War, foreign policy
seemed to be a matter of purely European interest,
not directly concerning the great Dominions; nor did
the problems of imperial defence appear very pressing
or urgent. But now all have realised that not
merely their interests, but their very existence,
may depend upon the wise conduct of foreign relations;
and now all have contributed the whole available strength
of their manhood to support a struggle in whose direction
they have had no effective share. These things
must henceforth be altered; and they can be altered
only in one or other of three ways. Either the
great Dominions will become independent states, as
the American colonies did, and pursue a foreign policy
and maintain a system of defence of their own; or
the Empire must reshape itself as a sort of permanent
offensive and defensive alliance, whose external policy
and modes of defence will be arranged by agreement;
or some mode of common management of these and other
questions must be devised. The first of these
solutions is unlikely to be adopted, not only because
the component members of the Empire are conscious
of their individual weakness, but still more because
the memory of the ordeal through which all have passed
must form an indissoluble bond. Yet rashness
or high-handedness in the treatment of the great issue
might lead even to this unlikely result. If either
of the other two solutions is adopted, the question
will at once arise of the place to be occupied, in
the league or in the reorganised super-state, of all
those innumerable sections of the Empire which do
not yet enjoy, and some of which may never enjoy,
the full privileges of self-government; and above all,
the place to be taken by the vast dominion of India,
which though it is not, and may not for a long time