Meanwhile, what had the threatened empires been doing during the years of strenuous German preparation which began in 1911?  Their governments could not but be aware of the enormous activity which was taking place in that country—­which was unthreatened on any side—­though they probably did not know how thorough and how elaborate it was.  What steps did they take to guard against the danger?  Russia was busy constructing strategic railways, to make the movement of troops easier; she was erecting new munition factories.  But neither could be quickly got ready.  France imposed upon the whole of her manhood the obligation of serving for three instead of for two years in the army.  Britain reorganised her small professional army, created the Territorial Force, and began the training of a large officer class in all the universities and public schools.  But she did not attempt to create a national army.  If she had done so, this would have been a signal for the precipitation of the war.  Besides, Britain obstinately clung to the belief that so monstrous a crime as Germany seemed to be contemplating could never be committed by a civilised nation; and she trusted mainly to her fleet for her own security.

But Britain unquestionably laboured with all her might to conjure away the nightmare.  From 1906 onwards she had made, in vain, repeated attempts to persuade Germany to accept a mutual disarmament or retardation of naval construction.  In 1912 she resolved upon a more definite step.  The German newspapers were full of talk about the British policy of ‘encircling’ Germany in order to attack and destroy her, which they attributed mainly to Sir Edward Grey.  It was a manifest absurdity, since the Franco-Russian alliance was formed in 1894, at a time when Britain was on bad terms with both France and Russia, and the agreements later made with these two countries were wholly devoted to removing old causes of dispute between them.  But the German people obviously believed it.  Perhaps the German government also believed it?  Britain resolved to remove this apprehension.  Accordingly in 1912 Lord Haldane was sent to Germany with a formal and definite statement, authorised by the Cabinet, to the effect that Britain had made no alliance or understanding which was aimed against Germany, and had no intention of doing so.  That being so, since Germany need have no fear of an attack from Britain, why should not the two powers agree to reduce their naval expenditure?  The German reply was that to stop the naval programme was impossible, but that construction might be delayed, on one condition—­that both powers should sign a formal agreement drawn up by Germany.  Each power was to pledge itself to absolute neutrality in any European war in which the other was engaged.  Each power was to undertake to make no new alliances.  But this agreement was not to affect existing alliances or the duties arising under them.  This proposal was an obvious trap, and the German ministers who