her ally, Russia, would begin a war without being sure of the concurrence of Britain, the most pacific of powers.  As the diplomatic records show, at the opening of the Great War they were not sure of this concurrence, even for naval purposes, until August 1, when the die was already cast.  The Triple Entente, therefore, was not an alliance; it was only an agreement for common diplomatic action in the hope of averting a terrible menace.

Until 1911 Germany, or some elements in Germany, seem to have hoped that she could get her own way by bullying and rattling her sabre, and that by these means she could frighten her rivals, make them mutually distrustful, and so break up their combination and deal with them in detail.  Those who held this view were the peace-party (so-called), and they included the Kaiser and his Chancellor.  They would probably not themselves have accepted this description of their policy, but in practice this is what it meant.  But there was always a formidable and influential party in Germany which had no patience with these hesitations, and was eager to draw the sabre.  It included the men of the General Staff, backed by the numerous Pan-German societies and newspapers.  The issue of the Morocco question in 1911, which showed that the policy of bullying had failed, played into the hands of the men of violence; and from this moment began the last strenuous burst of military preparation which preceded the war.  In 1911 was passed the first of a series of Army Acts for the increase of the already immense German army, and still more for the provision of vast equipment and the scientific apparatus of destruction; two further Acts for the same purpose followed in 1912 and in 1913.  In 1911 also was published General Bernhardi’s famous book, which defined and described the course of future action, and the aim which Germany was henceforth to pursue with all her strength:  Weltmacht oder Niedergang, world-power or downfall.

The events in the Balkans in 1912 and 1913 completed the conversion of those who still clung to the policy of peaceful bullying.  The formation and triumph of the Balkan League in 1912 formed a grave set-back for the Berlin-Bagdad project, which would be ruined if these little states became strong enough, or united enough, to be independent.  The break-up of the Balkan League and the second Balkan War of 1913 improved the situation from the German point of view.  But they left Serbia unsatisfactorily strong, and Serbia distrusted Austria, and controlled the communications with Constantinople.  Serbia must be destroyed; otherwise the Berlin-Bagdad project, and with it the world-power of which it was to be the main pillar, would be always insecure.  Austria was for attacking Serbia at once in 1913.  Germany held her back:  the widening of the Kiel Canal was not completed, and the fruits of the latest Army Acts were not yet fully reaped.  But all was ready in 1914; and the Great Challenge was launched.  It would have been launched at or about that time even if an unpopular Austrian archduke, significantly unguarded by the Austrian police, had not been most opportunely murdered by an Austrian subject on Austrian territory.  The murder was only a pretext.  The real cause of the war was the resolution of Germany to strike for world-supremacy, and her belief that the time was favourable for the great adventure.