entrance to the Mediterranean, and to threaten Algeria.  But this pretty scheme did not succeed.  The Entente held firm.  Britain gave steady support to France, as indeed she was bound in honour to do; and in the end a conference of the powers was held at Algeciras (Spain).  At this conference the predominating right of France to political influence in Morocco was formally recognised; and it was agreed that the government of the Sultan should be maintained, and that all countries should have equal trading rights in Morocco.  This was, of course, the very basis of the Franco-British agreement.  On every point at which she tried to score a success over France, Germany was defeated by the votes of the other powers, even her own ally, Italy, deserting her.

But the German intervention had had its effect.  The Sultan had refused the French scheme of reform.  The elements of disorder in Morocco were encouraged to believe that they had the protection of Germany, and the activity of German agents strengthened this belief.  The anarchy grew steadily worse.  In 1907 Sir Harry Maclean was captured by a brigand chief, and the British government had to pay 20,000 pounds ransom for his release.  In the same year a number of European workmen engaged on harbour works at Casablanca were murdered by tribesmen; and the French had to send a force which had a year’s fighting before it reduced the district to order.  In 1911 the Sultan was besieged in his capital (where there were a number of European residents) by insurgent tribesmen, and had to invite the French to send an army to his relief.

This was seized upon by Germany as a pretext.  Morocco was no longer ‘independent.’  The agreement of Algecras was dead.  Therefore she resumed her right to put forward what claims she pleased in Morocco.  Suddenly her gunboat, the Panther, appeared off Agadir.  It was meant as an assertion that Germany had as much right to intervene in Morocco as France.  And it was accompanied by a demand that if France wanted to be left free in Morocco, she must buy the approval of Germany.  The settlement of Morocco was to be a question solely between France and Germany.  The Entente of 1904, the agreement of 1906, the Moroccan interests of Britain (much more important than those of Germany), and the interests of the other powers of the Algeciras Conference, were to count for nothing.  Germany’s voice must be the determining factor.  But Germany announced that she was willing to be bought off by large concessions of French territory elsewhere—­provided that Britain was not allowed to have anything to say:  provided, that is, that the agreement of 1904 was scrapped.  This was a not too subtle way of trying to drive a wedge between two friendly powers.  It did not succeed.  Britain insisted upon being consulted.  There was for a time a real danger of war.  In the end peace was maintained by the cession by France of considerable areas in the Congo as the price of German abstention from intervening in a sphere where she had no right to intervene.  But Morocco was left under a definite French protectorate.