Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society.  We carry our view into the salutary consequences of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleasure.  The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful.  The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their gentle dominion over the breasts of men.

How considerable a part of their merit we ought to ascribe to their utility, will better appear from future disquisitions; [Footnote:  Sect.  III. and iv.] as well as the reason, why this circumstance has such a command over our esteem and approbation. [Footnote:  Sect.  V.]

SECTION III.

Of justice.

PART I.

That Justice is useful to society, and consequently that part of its merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove.  That public utility is the sole origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole foundation of its merit; this proposition, being more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and enquiry.

Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse abundance of all external conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire.  His natural beauty, we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments:  the perpetual clemency of the seasons renders useless all clothes or covering:  the raw herbage affords him the most delicious fare; the clear fountain, the richest beverage.  No laborious occupation required:  no tillage:  no navigation.  Music, poetry, and contemplation form his sole business:  conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement.  It seems evident that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed of.  For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough?  Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury?  Why call this object mine, when upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is equally valuable?  Justice, in that case, being totally useless, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues.