IV.  Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the object of love or hatred, nor are consequently susceptible of merit or iniquity.  A young tree, which over-tops and destroys its parent, stands in all the same relations with Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and if morality consisted merely in relations, would no doubt be equally criminal.

V. It appears evident that—­the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependance on the intellectual faculties.  Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep his health.  If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful.  If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any.  This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.

Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling.  If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he will answer, because he desires to get money.  If you demand why?  It is the instrument of pleasure, says he.  And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.  It is impossible there can be a progress

In infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired.  Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection.

Now as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee and reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys; it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you may please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.

Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained.  The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood:  the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.  The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, without addition and diminution:  the other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation.  Reason being cool