When it is affirmed that two and three are equal to the half of ten, this relation of equality I understand perfectly.  I conceive, that if ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many units as the other; and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three, it will contain as many units as that compound number.  But when you draw thence a comparison to moral relations, I own that I am altogether at a loss to understand you.  A moral action, a crime, such as ingratitude, is a complicated object.  Does the morality consist in the relation of its parts to each other?  How?  After what manner?  Specify the relation:  be more particular and explicit in your propositions, and you will easily see their falsehood.

No, say you, the morality consists in the relation of actions to the rule of right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or disagree with it.  What then is this rule of right?  In what does it consist?  How is it determined?  By reason, you say, which examines the moral relations of actions.  So that moral relations are determined by the comparison of action to a rule.  And that rule is determined by considering the moral relations of objects.  Is not this fine reasoning?

All this is metaphysics, you cry.  That is enough; there needs nothing more to give a strong presumption of falsehood.  Yes, reply I, here are metaphysics surely; but they are all on your side, who advance an abstruse hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate with any particular instance or illustration.  The hypothesis which we embrace is plain.  It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment.  It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to A spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.  We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence.  We consider all the circumstances in which these actions agree, and thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments.  If you call this metaphysics, and find anything abstruse here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is not suited to the moral sciences.

II.  When a man, at any time, deliberates concerning his own conduct (as, whether he had better, in a particular emergence, assist a brother or a benefactor), he must consider these separate relations, with all the circumstances and situations of the persons, in order to determine the superior duty and obligation; and in order to determine the proportion of lines in any triangle, it is necessary to examine the nature of that figure, and the relation which its several parts bear to each other.  But notwithstanding this appearing similarity in the two cases, there is, at bottom, an extreme difference between them.  A speculative reasoner concerning triangles or circles considers the several