Not many months after Roosevelt came back from South America, the Great War in Europe broke out.  It is but dreaming now to surmise what might have been done in those fearful days of July 1914, when the German hordes were gathering for their attack upon the world.  Once before, and singlehanded, this country had made the German Kaiser halt.  Had there been resolution in the White House in 1914, could all the neutral nations have been rallied at our side, and could we have spoken in tones so decisive to the Hun that he would have drawn back even then, have left Belgium unravaged, and spared the world the misery of the next four years?  It may be so; Germany did not expect to have to take on England as an enemy.  If she had been told, so that there was no mistaking our meaning, that she would have us against her as well, then it might have been her part to hesitate, and finally put back her sword.

Roosevelt supported the President at first, in his policy of neutrality, supposing him to have some special information.  He supported him with hesitation, and with qualifications however, pointing out that neutrality is no proud position, and has many disadvantages.  Perhaps he had some inklings of the danger to the country when our foreign affairs are managed by pacifists.  Certainly America had noticed the grim fact that a Government which forever talked about peace had in actual practice, shed more blood in a few hours at Vera Cruz than had been spilled in all the seven years while Roosevelt was President.  Moreover, this blood was shed uselessly; no object whatever having been gained by it.

It is impossible to understand Roosevelt; it is impossible to get any idea of what he did during his term of office; it is impossible to learn anything from his career, unless we contrast him and his beliefs and actions with the conduct of our Government during the Great War.  An object lesson of the most illuminating sort is afforded by this contrast, and we may make up our minds about the wisest paths to be followed in the future if we notice what Roosevelt said and did at this time, how far and how wisely his counsel was accepted or rejected.

He disapproved, for instance, President Wilson’s speech, made a day or two after the sinking of the Lusitania in which the President spoke of a nation being “too proud to fight.”  Roosevelt said that a nation which announced itself as too proud to fight was usually about proud enough to be kicked; and it must be admitted that the Germans took that view of it, and for a year and more continued to kick.  He did not deem it wise, when President Wilson informed the Germans, ten days later, that we remembered the “humane attitude” of their Government “in matters of international right,” for he happened to recall that Belgium was at that moment red with the blood of its citizens, slain by the Germans in a sort of warfare that combined highway robbery with revolting murder.  Neither did it seem useful to him to speak about German influence as always “upon the side of justice and humanity.”