365.  It is, however, important to consider the effects of combination in another and less obvious point of view.  The fear of combination amongst the men whom he employs, will have a tendency to induce the manufacturer to conceal from his workmen the extent of the orders he may at any time have received; and, consequently, they will always be less acquainted with the extent of the demand for their labour than they otherwise might be.  This is injurious to their interests; for instead of foreseeing, by the gradual falling-off in the orders, the approach of a time when they must be unemployed, and preparing accordingly, they are liable to much more sudden changes than those to which they would otherwise be exposed.

In the evidence given by Mr Galloway, the engineer, he remarks, that,

“When employers are competent to show their men that their business is steady and certain, and when men find that they are likely to have permanent employment, they have always better habits, and more settled notions, which will make them better men, and better workmen, and will produce great benefits to all who are interested in their employment.”

366.  As the manufacturer, when he makes a contract, has no security that a combination may not arise amongst the workmen, which may render that contract a loss instead of a benefit; besides taking precautions to prevent them from becoming acquainted with it, he must also add to the price at which he could otherwise sell the article, some small increase to cover the risk of such an occurrence.  If an establishment consist of several branches which can only be carried on jointly, as, for instance, of iron mines, blast furnaces, and a colliery, in which there are distinct classes of workmen, it becomes necessary to keep on hand a larger stock of materials than would be required, if it were certain that no combinations would arise.

Suppose, for instance, the colliers were to ‘strike’ for an advance of wages—­unless there was a stock of coal above ground, the furnaces must be stopped, and the miners also would be thrown out of employ.  Now the cost of keeping a stock of iron ore, or of coals above ground, is just the same as that of keeping in a drawer, unemployed, its value in money, (except, indeed, that the coal suffers a small deterioration by exposure to the elements).  The interest of this sum must, therefore, be considered as the price of an insurance against the risk of combination amongst the workmen; and it must, so far as it goes, increase the price of the manufactured article, and, consequently, limit the demand which would otherwise exist for it.  But every circumstance which tends to limit the demand, is injurious to the workmen; because the wider the demand, the less it is exposed to fluctuation.