Nor did I feel any great scruples with regard to the other Antarctic expeditions that were being planned at the time.  I knew I should be able to inform Captain Scott of the extension of my plans before he left civilization, and therefore a few months sooner or later could be of no great importance.  Scott’s plan and equipment were so widely different from my own that I regarded the telegram that I sent him later, with the information that we were bound for the Antarctic regions, rather as a mark of courtesy than as a communication which might cause him to alter his programme in the slightest degree.  The British expedition was designed entirely for scientific research.  The Pole was only a side-issue, whereas in my extended plan it was the main object.  On this little detour science would have to look after itself; but of course I knew very well that we could not reach the Pole by the route I had determined to take without enriching in a considerable degree several branches of science.

Our preparations were entirely different, and I doubt whether Captain Scott, with his great knowledge of Antarctic exploration, would have departed in any point from the experience he had gained and altered his equipment in accordance with that which I found it best to employ.  For I came far short of Scott both in experience and means.

As regards Lieutenant Shirase in the Kainan Maru, I understood it to be his plan to devote his whole attention to King Edward VII.  Land.

After thus thoroughly considering these questions, I came to the conclusions I have stated, and my plan was irrevocably fixed.  If at that juncture I had made my intention public, it would only have given occasion for a lot of newspaper discussion, and possibly have ended in the project being stifled at its birth.  Everything had to be got ready quietly and calmly.  My brother, upon whose absolute silence I could blindly rely, was the only person I let into the secret of my change of plan, and he did me many important services during the time when we alone shared the knowledge.  Then Lieutenant Thorvald Nilsen —­ at that time first officer of the Fram, now her commander —­ returned home, and I considered it my duty to inform him immediately of my resolve.  The way in which he received it made me feel safe in my choice of him.  I saw that in him I had found not only a capable and trustworthy man, but a good comrade as well; and this was a point of the highest importance.  If the relations between the chief and the second in command are good, much unpleasantness and many unnecessary worries can be avoided.  Besides which, a good understanding in this quarter gives an example to the whole ship.  It was a great relief to me when Captain Nilsen came home in January, 1910, and was able to help —­ which he did with a good will, a capability, and a reliability that I have no words to commend.

The following was the plan of the Fram’s southern voyage:  Departure from Norway at latest before the middle of August.  Madeira was to be the first and only place of call.  From there a course was to be made on the best route for a sailing-ship —­ for the Fram cannot be regarded as anything else —­ southward through the Atlantic, and then to the east, passing to the south of the Cape of Good Hope and Australia, and finally pushing through the pack and into Ross Sea about New Year, 1911.