—­The connotation of the word, Stephen said, is rather vague.  Aquinas uses a term which seems to be inexact.  It baffled me for a long time.  It would lead you to believe that he had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol.  I thought he might mean that CLARITAS is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalization which would make the esthetic image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions.  But that is literary talk.  I understand it so.  When you have apprehended that basket as one thing and have then analysed it according to its form and apprehended it as a thing you make the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible.  You see that it is that thing which it is and no other thing.  The radiance of which he speaks in the scholastic QUIDDITAS, the WHATNESS of a thing.  This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination.  The mind in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal.  The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure, a spiritual state very like to that cardiac condition which the Italian physiologist Luigi Galvani, using a phrase almost as beautiful as Shelley’s, called the enchantment of the heart.

Stephen paused and, though his companion did not speak, felt that his words had called up around them a thought-enchanted silence.

—­What I have said, he began again, refers to beauty in the wider sense of the word, in the sense which the word has in the literary tradition.  In the marketplace it has another sense.  When we speak of beauty in the second sense of the term our judgement is influenced in the first place by the art itself and by the form of that art.  The image, it is clear, must be set between the mind or senses of the artist himself and the mind or senses of others.  If you bear this in memory you will see that art necessarily divides itself into three forms progressing from one to the next.  These forms are:  the lyrical form, the form wherein the artist presents his image in immediate relation to himself; the epical form, the form wherein he presents his image in mediate relation to himself and to others; the dramatic form, the form wherein he presents his image in immediate relation to others.

—­That you told me a few nights ago, said Lynch, and we began the famous discussion.

—­I have a book at home, said Stephen, in which I have written down questions which are more amusing than yours were.  In finding the answers to them I found the theory of esthetic which I am trying to explain.  Here are some questions I set myself:  Is A chair finely made tragic or comic?  Is the portrait of Mona Lisa good if I desire to see it?  If not, why not?