Election Day.  November 5, [1918]

At Cabinet some one asked if Germany would accept armistice terms. 
The President said he thought so. ...

The President spoke of the Bolsheviki having decided upon a revolution in Germany, Hungary, and Switzerland, and that they had ten million dollars ready in Switzerland, besides more money in Swedish banks held by the Jews from Russia, ready for the campaign of propaganda.  He read a despatch from the French minister in Berne, to Jusserand, telling of this conspiracy.  Houston suggested the advisability of stopping it by seizing the money and interning the agitators.  After some discussion, the President directed Lansing to ask the Governments in Switzerland and Sweden to get the men and money, and hold them, and then to notify the Allies of what we had done and suggest that they do likewise.  Lansing suggested a joint Note, but the President vetoed this idea, wanting us to take the initiative.  He spoke of always having been sympathetic with Japan in her war with Russia, and thought that the latter would have to work out her own salvation.  But he was in favor of sending food to France, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria just as soon as possible; and the need was great, also in Austria.

He said that the terms had been agreed upon, but he did not say what they were—­further than to say that the Council at Versailles had agreed to his fourteen points, with two reservations:—­(1) as to the meaning of the freedom of the seas, (2) as to the meaning of the restoration of Belgium and France.  This word he had directed Lansing to give to the Swiss minister for Germany—­and to notify Germany also that Foch would talk the terms of armistice. ...  He is certainly in splendid humor and in good trim—­not worried a bit.  And why should he be, for the world is at his feet, eating out of his hand!  No Caesar ever had such a triumph! ...

November 6, 1918

Yesterday we had an election.  I had expected we would win because the President had made a personal appeal for a vote of confidence, and all other members of the Cabinet had followed suit, except Baker who said he wanted to keep the Army out of politics.  The President thought it was necessary to make such an appeal.  He liked the idea of personal leadership, and he has received a slap in the face—­for both Houses are in the balance.  This is the culmination of the policy Burleson urged when he got the President to sign a telegram which he (Burleson) had written opposing Representative Slayden, his personal enemy, from San Antonio, and, in effect, nominating Burleson’s brother-in-law for Congress.  We heard of it by the President bringing it up at Cabinet.  Burleson worked it through Tumulty.  The President said that he did not know whether to write other letters of a similar nature as to Vardaman, Hardwick, et Al.  I advised against it, saying that the voters had sense enough to take care of these people.