The King wished to open this campaign with two battles; one in Italy, the other in Flanders.  His desire was to some extent gratified in the former case; but in the other he met with a sad and cruel disappointment.  Since the departure of Marechal de Villeroy for Flanders, the King had more than once pressed him to engage the enemy.  The Marechal, piqued with these reiterated orders, which he considered as reflections upon his courage, determined to risk anything in order to satisfy the desire of the King.  But the King did not wish this.  At the same time that he wished for a battle in Flanders, he wished to place Villeroy in a state to fight it.  He sent orders, therefore, to Marsin to take eighteen battalions and twenty squadrons of his army, to proceed to the Moselle, where he would find twenty others, and then to march with the whole into Flanders, and join Marechal de Villeroy.  At the same time he prohibited the latter from doing anything until this reinforcement reached him.  Four couriers, one after the other, carried this prohibition to the Marechal; but he had determined to give battle without assistance, and he did so, with what result will be seen.

On the 24th of May he posted himself between the villages of Taviers and Ramillies.  He was superior in force to the Duke of Marlborough, who was opposed to him, and this fact gave him confidence.  Yet the position which he had taken up was one which was well known to be bad.  The late M. de Luxembourg had declared it so, and had avoided it.  M. de Villeroy had been a witness of this, but it was his destiny and that of France that he should forget it.  Before he took up this position he announced that it was his intention to do so to M. d’Orleans.  M. d’Orleans said publicly to all who came to listen, that if M. de Villeroy did so he would be beaten.  M. d’Orleans proved to be only too good a prophet.

Just as M. de Villeroy had taken up his position and made his arrangements, the Elector arrived in hot haste from Brussels.  It was too late now to blame what had been done.  There was nothing for it but to complete what had been already begun, and await the result.

It was about two hours after midday when the enemy arrived within range, and came under our fire from Ramillies.  It forced them to halt until their cannon could be brought into play, which was soon done.  The cannonade lasted a good hour.  At the end of that time they marched to Taviers, where a part of our army was posted, found but little resistance, and made themselves masters of that place.  From that moment they brought their cavalry to bear.  They perceived that there was a marsh which covered our left, but which hindered our two wings from joining.  They made good use of the advantage this gave them.  We were taken in the rear at more than one point, and Taviers being no longer able to assist us, Ramillies itself fell, after a prodigious fire and an obstinate resistance.  The Comte de Guiche at the head of the regiment of Guards defended it for four hours, and performed prodigies, but in the end he was obliged to give way.  All this time our left had been utterly useless with its nose in the marsh, no enemy in front of it, and with strict orders not to budge from its position.