bad; because if he had been beaten he could not have retreated, as there was only one road leading through the forest in his rear.  He also committed a fault which might have proved the destruction of all his army, without its ever having commenced the campaign, or being drawn out in battle; he allowed himself to be surprised.  On the 15th I was at Charleroi, and had beaten the Prussians without his knowing anything about it.  I had gained forty-eight hours of manoeuvres upon him, which was a great object; and if some of my generals had shown that vigour and genius which they had displayed on other occasions, I should have taken his army in cantonments without ever fighting a battle.  But they were discouraged, and fancied that they saw an army of 100,000 men everywhere opposed to them.  I had not time enough myself to attend to the minutiae of the army.  I counted upon surprising and cutting Wellington up in detail.  I knew of Bulow’s arrival at eleven o’clock, but I did not regard it.  I had still eighty chances out of a hundred in my favour.  Notwithstanding the great superiority of force against me I was convinced that I should obtain the victory, I had about 70,000 men, of whom 15,000 were cavalry.  I had also 260 pieces of cannon; but my troops were so good that I esteemed them sufficient to beat 120,000.  Of all those troops, however, I only reckoned the English as being able to cope with my own.  The others I thought little of.  I believe that of English there were from 35,000 to 40,000.  These I esteemed to be as brave and as good as my own troops; the English army was well known latterly on the Continent, and besides, your nation possesses courage and energy.  As to the Prussians, Belgians, and others, half the number of my troops, were sufficient to beat them.  I only left 34,000 men to take care of the Prussians.  The chief causes of the loss of that battle were, first of all, Grouchy’s great tardiness and neglect in executing his orders; next, the ‘grenadiers a cheval’ and the cavalry under General Guyot, which I had in reserve, and which were never to leave me, engaged without orders and without my knowledge; so that after the last charge, when the troops were beaten and the English cavalry advanced, I had not a single corps of cavalry in reserve to resist them, instead of one which I esteemed to be equal to double their own number.  In consequence of this the English attacked, succeeded, and all was lost.  There was no means of rallying.  The youngest general would not have committed the fault of leaving an army entirely without reserve, which, however, occurred here, whether in consequence of treason or not I cannot say.  These were the two principal causes of the loss of the battle of Waterloo.”