me by the way in which the plan of a landing on the coast of Provence was discussed.  Precise answers were requested on all these points.  On returning the letter to M. de Blacas I remarked that the contents of the letter called for the adoption of some decided measures, and I asked him what had been done.  He answered, “I immediately sent a copy of the letter to M. d’Andre, that he might give orders for arresting the individual to whom it was addressed.”

Having had the opportunity of closely observing the machinery of a vigilant and active Government, I was, I must confess, not a little amazed at the insufficiency of the measures adopted to defeat this well-planned conspiracy.  When M. de Blacas informed me of all that had been done, I could not repress an exclamation of surprise.  “Well,” said he, “and what would you have done?”—­“In the first place I would not have lost twenty-four hours, which were an age in such a crisis.”  I then explained the plan I would have adopted.  A quarter of an hour after the receipt of the letter I would have sent trustworthy men to Grenoble, and above all things I would have taken care not to let the matter fall into the hands of the police.  Having obtained all information from the correspondent at Grenoble, I would have made him write a letter to his correspondent at Elba to quiet the eagerness of Napoleon, telling him that the movement of troops he spoke of had not been made, that it would take eight days to carry it out, and that it was necessary to the success of the enterprise to delay the embarkation for some days.  While Bonaparte was thus delayed I would have sent to the coast of Provence a sufficient body of men devoted to the Royal cause, sending off in another direction the regiments whose chiefs were gained over by Napoleon, as the correspondence should reveal their names.  “You are perhaps right, sir,” said M. de Blacas, “but what could I do?  I am new here.  I had not the control of the police, and I trusted to M. d’Andre.”—­“Well,” said I, “Bonaparte will be here on the 20th of March.”  With these words I parted from M. de Blacas.  I remarked a great change in him.  He had already lost a vast deal of that hauteur of favouritism which made him so much disliked.

When I entered upon my duties in the Prefecture of Police the evil was already past remedy.  The incorrigible emigres required another lesson, and the temporary resurrection of the Empire was inevitable.  But, if Bonaparte was recalled, it was not owing to any attachment to him personally; it was not from any fidelity to the recollections of the Empire.  It was resolved at any price to get rid of those imbecile councillors, who thought they might treat France like a country conquered by the emigrants.  The people determined to free themselves from a Government which seemed resolved to trample on all that was dear to France.  In this state of things some looked upon Bonaparte as a liberator, but the greater number regarded him as an instrument.  In this last character he was viewed by the old Republicans, and by a new generation, who thought they caught a glimpse of liberty in promises, and Who were blind enough to believe that the idol of France would be restored by Napoleon.