There could not be a more ingenuous confession of the antipathy which Joachim knew the Neapolitans to entertain towards his person and government.  His address to the French was ineffectual.  It was easy to foresee what would ensue.  The Viceroy soon received an official communication from Napoleon’s War Minister, accompanied by an Imperial decree, recalling all the French who were in the service of Joachim, and declaring that all who were taken with arms in their hands should be tried by a courtmartial as traitors to their country.  Murat commenced by gaining advantages which could not be disputed.  His troops almost immediately took possession of Leghorn and the citadel of Ancona, and the French were obliged to evacuate Tuscany.

The defection of Murat overthrew one of Bonaparte’s gigantic conceptions.  He had planned that Murat and Eugene with their combined forces should march on the rear of the Allies, while he, disputing the soil of France with the invaders, should multiply obstacles to their advance; the King of Naples and the Viceroy of Italy were to march upon Vienna and make Austria tremble in the heart of her capital before the timid million of her Allies, who measured their steps as they approached Paris, should desecrate by their presence the capital of France.  When informed of the vast project, which, however, was but the dream of a moment, I immediately recognised that eagle glance, that power of discovering great resources in great calamities, so peculiar to Bonaparte.

Napoleon was yet Emperor of France; but he who had imposed on all Europe treaties of peace no less disastrous than the wars which had preceded them, could not now obtain an armistice; and Caulaincourt, who was sent to treat for one at the camp of the Allies, spent twenty days at Luneville before he could even obtain permission to pass the advanced posts of the invading army.  In vain did Caulaincourt entreat Napoleon to sacrifice, or at least resign temporarily, a portion of that glory acquired in so many battles, and which nothing could efface in history.  Napoleon replied, “I will sign whatever you wish.  To obtain peace I will exact no condition; but I will not dictate my own humiliation.”  This concession, of course, amounted to a determination not to sign or to grant anything.

In the first fortnight of January 1814 one-third of France was invaded, and it was proposed to form a new Congress, to be held at Chatillon-sur-Seine.  The situation of Napoleon grew daily worse and worse.  He was advised to seek extraordinary resources in the interior of the Empire, and was reminded of the fourteen armies which rose, as if by enchantment, to defend France at the commencement of the Revolution.  Finally, a reconciliation with the Jacobins, a party who had power to call up masses to aid him, was recommended.  For a moment he was inclined to adopt this advice.  He rode on horseback through the surburbs of St. Antoine and St. Marceau, courted the populace, affectionately