If the writings of Tacitus indicate anything true of his qualities, he was a great personage, upright and bold, not of a superstitious but of a philosophical and generous virtue.  One may think him bold in his relations; as where he tells us, that a soldier carrying a burden of wood, his hands were so frozen and so stuck to the load that they there remained closed and dead, being severed from his arms.  I always in such things bow to the authority of so great witnesses.

What also he says, that Vespasian, “by the favour of the god Serapis, cured a blind woman at Alexandria by anointing her eyes with his spittle, and I know not what other miracle,” he says by the example and duty of all his good historians.  They record all events of importance; and amongst public incidents are the popular rumours and opinions.  ’Tis their part to relate common beliefs, not to regulate them:  that part concerns divines and philosophers, directors of consciences; and therefore it was that this companion of his, and a great man like himself, very wisely said: 

     “Equidem plura transcribo, quam credo:  nam nec affirmare
     sustineo, de quibus dubito, nec subducere quae accepi;”

     ["Truly, I set down more things than I believe, for I can neither
     affirm things whereof I doubt, nor suppress what I have heard.” 
     —­Quintus Curtius, ix.]

and this other: 

               “Haec neque affirmare neque refellere operae
               pretium est; famae rerum standum est.”

     ["’Tis neither worth the while to affirm or to refute these things;
     we must stand to report”—­Livy, i., Praef., and viii. 6.]

And writing in an age wherein the belief of prodigies began to decline, he says he would not, nevertheless, forbear to insert in his Annals, and to give a relation of things received by so many worthy men, and with so great reverence of antiquity; ’tis very well said.  Let them deliver to us history, more as they receive it than as they believe it.  I, who am monarch of the matter whereof I treat, and who am accountable to none, do not, nevertheless, always believe myself; I often hazard sallies of my own wit, wherein I very much suspect myself, and certain verbal quibbles, at which I shake my ears; but I let them go at a venture.  I see that others get reputation by such things:  ’tis not for me alone to judge.  I present myself standing and lying, before and behind, my right side and my left, and, in all my natural postures.  Wits, though equal in force, are not always equal in taste and application.

This is what my memory presents to me in gross, and with uncertainty enough; all judgments in gross are weak and imperfect.

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