I was not an hour about it:  I have never looked at it since.”  Well, then, say I, lay these aside, and give me a perfect one, such as you would be measured by.  And then, what do you think is the best thing in your work? is it this part or that? is it grace or the matter, the invention, the judgment, or the learning?  For I find that men are, commonly, as wide of the mark in judging of their own works, as of those of others; not only by reason of the kindness they have for them, but for want of capacity to know and distinguish them:  the work, by its own force and fortune, may second the workman, and sometimes outstrip him, beyond his invention and knowledge.  For my part, I judge of the value of other men’s works more obscurely than of my own; and place the Essays, now high, or low, with great doubt and inconstancy.  There are several books that are useful upon the account of their subjects, from which the author derives no praise; and good books, as well as good works, that shame the workman.  I may write the manner of our feasts, and the fashion of our clothes, and may write them ill; I may publish the edicts of my time, and the letters of princes that pass from hand to hand; I may make an abridgment of a good book (and every abridgment of a good book is a foolish abridgment), which book shall come to be lost; and so on:  posterity will derive a singular utility from such compositions:  but what honour shall I have unless by great good fortune?  Most part of the famous books are of this condition.

When I read Philip de Commines, doubtless a very good author, several years ago, I there took notice of this for no vulgar saying, “That a man must have a care not to do his master so great service, that at last he will not know how to give him his just reward”; but I ought to commend the invention, not him, because I met with it in Tacitus, not long since: 

         “Beneficia ea usque lxta sunt, dum videntur exsolvi posse;
          ubi multum antevenere, pro gratis odium redditur;”

["Benefits are so far acceptable as they appear to be capable of
recompense; where they much exceed that point, hatred is returned
instead of thanks.”—­Tacitus, Annal., iv. 18.]

and Seneca vigorously says: 

“Nam qui putat esse turpe non reddere,
non vult esse cui reddat:” 

["For he who thinks it a shame not to requite, does not wish to
have the man live to whom he owes return.”—­Seneca, Ep., 81.]

Q. Cicero says with less directness.: 

                   “Qui se non putat satisfacere,
                    amicus esse nullo modo potest.”

["Who thinks himself behind in obligation, can by no
means be a friend.”—­Q.  Cicero, De Petitione Consul, c. 9.]