“Nonne vides, Albi ut male vivat filius? utque
          Barrus inops? magnum documentum, ne patriam rein
          Perdere guis velit;”

["Dost thou not see how ill the son of Albus lives? and how the
indigent Barrus? a great warning lest any one should incline to
dissipate his patrimony.”—­Horace, Sat., i. 4, 109.]

publishing and accusing my own imperfections, some one will learn to be afraid of them.  The parts that I most esteem in myself, derive more honour from decrying, than for commending myself which is the reason why I so often fall into, and so much insist upon that strain.  But, when all is summed up, a man never speaks of himself without loss; a man’s accusations of himself are always believed; his praises never:  There may, peradventure, be some of my own complexion who better instruct myself by contrariety than by similitude, and by avoiding than by imitation.  The elder Cato was regarding this sort of discipline, when he said, “that the wise may learn more of fools, than fools can of the wise”; and Pausanias tells us of an ancient player upon the harp, who was wont to make his scholars go to hear one who played very ill, who lived over against him, that they might learn to hate his discords and false measures.  The horror of cruelty more inclines me to clemency, than any example of clemency could possibly do.  A good rider does not so much mend my seat, as an awkward attorney or a Venetian, on horseback; and a clownish way of speaking more reforms mine than the most correct.  The ridiculous and simple look of another always warns and advises me; that which pricks, rouses and incites much better than that which tickles.  The time is now proper for us to reform backward; more by dissenting than by agreeing; by differing more than by consent.  Profiting little by good examples, I make use of those that are ill, which are everywhere to be found:  I endeavour to render myself as agreeable as I see others offensive; as constant as I see others fickle; as affable as I see others rough; as good as I see others evil:  but I propose to myself impracticable measures.

The most fruitful and natural exercise of the mind, in my opinion, is conversation; I find the use of it more sweet than of any other action of life; and for that reason it is that, if I were now compelled to choose, I should sooner, I think, consent to lose my sight, than my hearing and speech.  The Athenians, and also the Romans, kept this exercise in great honour in their academies; the Italians retain some traces of it to this day, to their great advantage, as is manifest by the comparison of our understandings with theirs.  The study of books is a languishing and feeble motion that heats not, whereas conversation teaches and exercises at once.  If I converse with a strong mind and a rough disputant, he presses upon my flanks, and pricks me right and left; his imaginations stir up mine; jealousy, glory, and contention, stimulate