“Mihi nempe valere et vivere doctus.”

               ["To live and to do well for myself.” 
               —­Lucretius, v. 959.]

Now I find my opinions very bold and constant in condemning my own imperfection.  And, to say the truth, ’tis a subject upon which I exercise my judgment as much as upon any other.  The world looks always opposite; I turn my sight inwards, and there fix and employ it.  I have no other business but myself, I am eternally meditating upon myself, considering and tasting myself.  Other men’s thoughts are ever wandering abroad, if they will but see it; they are still going forward: 

“Nemo in sese tentat descendere;”

          ["No one thinks of descending into himself.” 
          —­Persius, iv. 23.]

for my part, I circulate in myself.  This capacity of trying the truth, whatever it be, in myself, and this free humour of not over easily subjecting my belief, I owe principally to myself; for the strongest and most general imaginations I have are those that, as a man may say, were born with me; they are natural and entirely my own.  I produced them crude and simple, with a strong and bold production, but a little troubled and imperfect; I have since established and fortified them with the authority of others and the sound examples of the ancients, whom I have found of the same judgment:  they have given me faster hold, and a more manifest fruition and possession of that I had before embraced.  The reputation that every one pretends to of vivacity and promptness of wit, I seek in regularity; the glory they pretend to from a striking and signal action, or some particular excellence, I claim from order, correspondence, and tranquillity of opinions and manners: 

     “Omnino si quidquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis, quam
     aequabilitas universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam
     conservare non possis, si, aliorum naturam imitans, omittas tuam.”

["If anything be entirely decorous, nothing certainly can be more so than an equability alike in the whole life and in every particular action; which thou canst not possibly observe if, imitating other men’s natures, thou layest aside thy own.”—­Cicero, De Of., i. 31.]

Here, then, you see to what degree I find myself guilty of this first part, that I said was the vice of presumption.  As to the second, which consists in not having a sufficient esteem for others, I know not whether or no I can so well excuse myself; but whatever comes on’t I am resolved to speak the truth.  And whether, peradventure, it be that the continual frequentation I have had with the humours of the ancients, and the idea of those great souls of past ages, put me out of taste both with others and myself, or that, in truth, the age we live in produces but very indifferent things, yet so it is that I see nothing worthy of any great admiration.  Neither, indeed, have I so great an intimacy with many men as is requisite to make a right judgment of them; and those with whom my condition makes me the most frequent, are, for the most part, men who have little care of the culture of the soul, but that look upon honour as the sum of all blessings, and valour as the height of all perfection.