I was present one day at Barleduc, when King Francis ii., for a memorial of Rene, king of Sicily, was presented with a portrait he had drawn of himself:  why is it not in like manner lawful for every one to draw himself with a pen, as he did with a crayon?  I will not, therefore, omit this blemish though very unfit to be published, which is irresolution; a very great effect and very incommodious in the negotiations of the affairs of the world; in doubtful enterprises, I know not which to choose: 

“Ne si, ne no, nel cor mi suona intero.”

     ["My heart does not tell me either yes or no.”—­Petrarch.]

I can maintain an opinion, but I cannot choose one.  By reason that in human things, to what sect soever we incline, many appearances present themselves that confirm us in it; and the philosopher Chrysippus said, that he would of Zeno and Cleanthes, his masters, learn their doctrines only; for, as to proofs and reasons, he should find enough of his own.  Which way soever I turn, I still furnish myself with causes, and likelihood enough to fix me there; which makes me detain doubt and the liberty of choosing, till occasion presses; and then, to confess the truth, I, for the most part, throw the feather into the wind, as the saying is, and commit myself to the mercy of fortune; a very light inclination and circumstance carries me along with it.

         “Dum in dubio est animus, paulo momento huc atque
          Illuc impellitur.”

["While the mind is in doubt, in a short time it is impelled this
way and that.”—­Terence, Andr., i. 6, 32.]

The uncertainty of my judgment is so equally balanced in most occurrences, that I could willingly refer it to be decided by the chance of a die:  and I observe, with great consideration of our human infirmity, the examples that the divine history itself has left us of this custom of referring to fortune and chance the determination of election in doubtful things: 

“Sors cecidit super Matthiam.”

["The lot fell upon Matthew.”—­Acts i. 26.]

Human reason is a two-edged and dangerous sword:  observe in the hands of Socrates, her most intimate and familiar friend, how many several points it has.  I am thus good for nothing but to follow and suffer myself to be easily carried away with the crowd; I have not confidence enough in my own strength to take upon me to command and lead; I am very glad to find the way beaten before me by others.  If I must run the hazard of an uncertain choice, I am rather willing to have it under such a one as is more confident in his opinions than I am in mine, whose ground and foundation I find to be very slippery and unsure.

Yet I do not easily change, by reason that I discern the same weakness in contrary opinions: 

“Ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa
esse videtur, et lubrica;”

["The very custom of assenting seems to be dangerous
and slippery.”—­Cicero, Acad., ii. 21.]