CHAPTER VIII

OF THE ART OF CONFERENCE

’Tis a custom of our justice to condemn some for a warning to others.  To condemn them for having done amiss, were folly, as Plato says,

[Diogenes Laertius, however, in his Life of Plato, iii. 181, says
that Plato’s offence was the speaking too freely to the tyrant.]

for what is done can never be undone; but ’tis to the end they may offend no more, and that others may avoid the example of their offence:  we do not correct the man we hang; we correct others by him.  I do the same; my errors are sometimes natural, incorrigible, and irremediable:  but the good which virtuous men do to the public, in making themselves imitated, I, peradventure, may do in making my manners avoided: 

         “Nonne vides, Albi ut male vivat filius? utque
          Barrus inops? magnum documentum, ne patriam rein
          Perdere guis velit;”

["Dost thou not see how ill the son of Albus lives? and how the
indigent Barrus? a great warning lest any one should incline to
dissipate his patrimony.”—­Horace, Sat., i. 4, 109.]

publishing and accusing my own imperfections, some one will learn to be afraid of them.  The parts that I most esteem in myself, derive more honour from decrying, than for commending myself which is the reason why I so often fall into, and so much insist upon that strain.  But, when all is summed up, a man never speaks of himself without loss; a man’s accusations of himself are always believed; his praises never:  There may, peradventure, be some of my own complexion who better instruct myself by contrariety than by similitude, and by avoiding than by imitation.  The elder Cato was regarding this sort of discipline, when he said, “that the wise may learn more of fools, than fools can of the wise”; and Pausanias tells us of an ancient player upon the harp, who was wont to make his scholars go to hear one who played very ill, who lived over against him, that they might learn to hate his discords and false measures.  The horror of cruelty more inclines me to clemency, than any example of clemency could possibly do.  A good rider does not so much mend my seat, as an awkward attorney or a Venetian, on horseback; and a clownish way of speaking more reforms mine than the most correct.  The ridiculous and simple look of another always warns and advises me; that which pricks, rouses and incites much better than that which tickles.  The time is now proper for us to reform backward; more by dissenting than by agreeing; by differing more than by consent.  Profiting little by good examples, I make use of those that are ill, which are everywhere to be found:  I endeavour to render myself as agreeable as I see others offensive; as constant as I see others fickle; as affable as I see others rough; as good as I see others evil:  but I propose to myself impracticable measures.