These philosophers say that it is not enough to have the soul seated in a good place, of a good temper, and well disposed to virtue; it is not enough to have our resolutions and our reasoning fixed above all the power of fortune, but that we are, moreover, to seek occasions wherein to put them to the proof:  they would seek pain, necessity, and contempt to contend with them and to keep the soul in breath: 

“Multum sibi adjicit virtus lacessita.”

               ["Virtue is much strengthened by combats.”
               or:  “Virtue attacked adds to its own force.” 
               —­Seneca, Ep., 13.]

’Tis one of the reasons why Epaminondas, who was yet of a third sect, —­[The Pythagorean.]—­refused the riches fortune presented to him by very lawful means; because, said he, I am to contend with poverty, in which extreme he maintained himself to the last.  Socrates put himself, methinks, upon a ruder trial, keeping for his exercise a confounded scolding wife, which was fighting at sharps.  Metellus having, of all the Roman senators, alone attempted, by the power of virtue, to withstand the violence of Saturninus, tribune of the people at Rome, who would, by all means, cause an unjust law to pass in favour of the commons, and, by so doing, having incurred the capital penalties that Saturninus had established against the dissentient, entertained those who, in this extremity, led him to execution with words to this effect:  That it was a thing too easy and too base to do ill; and that to do well where there was no danger was a common thing; but that to do well where there was danger was the proper office of a man of virtue.  These words of Metellus very clearly represent to us what I would make out, viz., that virtue refuses facility for a companion; and that the easy, smooth, and descending way by which the regular steps of a sweet disposition of nature are conducted is not that of a true virtue; she requires a rough and stormy passage; she will have either exotic difficulties to wrestle with, like that of Metellus, by means whereof fortune delights to interrupt the speed of her career, or internal difficulties, that the inordinate appetites and imperfections of our condition introduce to disturb her.

I am come thus far at my ease; but here it comes into my head that the soul of Socrates, the most perfect that ever came to my knowledge, should by this rule be of very little recommendation; for I cannot conceive in that person any the least motion of a vicious inclination:  I cannot imagine there could be any difficulty or constraint in the course of his virtue:  I know his reason to be so powerful and sovereign over him that she would never have suffered a vicious appetite so much as to spring in him.  To a virtue so elevated as his, I have nothing to oppose.  Methinks I see him march, with a victorious and triumphant pace, in pomp and at his ease, without opposition or disturbance.