discourse of philosophy.  “The gods forbid,” said Posidonius to him, “that pain should ever have the power to hinder me from talking,” and thereupon fell immediately upon a discourse of the contempt of pain :  but, in the meantime, his own infirmity was playing his part, and plagued him to purpose; to which he cried out, “Thou mayest work thy will, pain, and torment me with all the power thou hast, but thou shalt never make me say that thou art an evil.”  This story that they make such a clutter withal, what has it to do, I fain would know, with the contempt of pain?  He only fights it with words, and in the meantime, if the shootings and dolours he felt did not move him, why did he interrupt his discourse?  Why did he fancy he did so great a thing in forbearing to confess it an evil?  All does not here consist in the imagination; our fancies may work upon other things:  but here is the certain science that is playing its part, of which our senses themselves are judges: 

          “Qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa sit omnis.”

     ["Which, if they be not true, all reasoning may also be false. 
     —­“Lucretius, iv. 486.]

Shall we persuade our skins that the jerks of a whip agreeably tickle us, or our taste that a potion of aloes is vin de Graves?  Pyrrho’s hog is here in the same predicament with us; he is not afraid of death, ’tis true, but if you beat him he will cry out to some purpose.  Shall we force the general law of nature, which in every living creature under heaven is seen to tremble under pain?  The very trees seem to groan under the blows they receive.  Death is only felt by reason, forasmuch as it is the motion of an instant;

         “Aut fuit, aut veniet; nihil est praesentis in illa.”

["Death has been, or will come:  there is nothing of the present in
it.”—­Estienne de la Boetie, Satires.]

“Morsque minus poenae, quam mora mortis, habet;”

["The delay of death is more painful than death itself.” 
—­Ovid, Ep.  Ariadne to Theseus, v. 42.]

a thousand beasts, a thousand men, are sooner dead than threatened.  That also which we principally pretend to fear in death is pain, its ordinary forerunner:  yet, if we may believe a holy father: 

          “Malam mortem non facit, nisi quod sequitur mortem.”

          ["That which follows death makes death bad.” 
          —­St. Augustin, De Civit.  Dei, i. ii.]

And I should yet say, more probably, that neither that which goes before nor that which follows after is at all of the appurtenances of death.

We excuse ourselves falsely:  and I find by experience that it is rather the impatience of the imagination of death that makes us impatient of pain, and that we find it doubly grievous as it threatens us with death.  But reason accusing our cowardice for fearing a thing so sudden, so inevitable, and so insensible, we take the other as the more excusable pretence.  All ills that carry no other danger along with them but simply the evils themselves, we treat as things of no danger:  the toothache or the gout, painful as they are, yet being not reputed mortal, who reckons them in the catalogue of diseases?