the only one of the younger Marshals who had not been tried in Spain, and so far he was fortunate; but, though he was not popular with the army, his character and services seem to point him out as the most fit of all the Marshals for an independent command.  Had Napoleon been successful in 1812, Davoust was to have received the Viceroyalty of Poland; and he would probably have left a higher name in history than the other men placed by Napoleon to rule over his outlying kingdoms.  In any case it was fortunate for France and for the Allies that a man of his character ruled the army after Napoleon abdicated; there would otherwise have been wild work round Paris, as it was only with the greatest difficulty and by the force of his authority and example that Davoust succeeded in getting the army to withdraw from the capital, and to gradually adopt the white cockade.  When superseded by Macdonald he had done a work no other man could have accomplished.  He protested against the proscription, but it was too late; his power had departed.  In 1819 he was forgiven for his services to France, and was made a peer, but he died in 1823, only fifty-three years old.

Among the Marshals who gave an active support to Napoleon Ney takes the leading part in most eyes; if it were only for his fate, which is too well known for much to be said here concerning it.  In 1815 Ney was commanding in Franche-Comte, and was called up to Paris and ordered to go to Besancon to march so as to take Napoleon in flank.  He started off, not improbably using the rough brags afterwards attributed to him as most grievous sins, such as that “he would bring back Napoleon in an iron cage.”  It had been intended to have sent the Due de Berry, the second son of the Comte d’Artois, with Ney; and it was most unfortunate for the Marshal that this was not done.  There can be no possible doubt that Ney spoke and acted in good faith when he left Paris.  One point alone seems decisive of this.  Ney found under him in command, as General of Division, Bourmont, an officer of well-known Royalist opinions, who had at one time served with the Vendean insurgents, and who afterwards deserted Napoleon just before Waterloo, although he had entreated to be employed in the campaign.  Not only did Ney leave Bourmont in command, but, requiring another Divisional General, instead of selecting a Bonapartist, he urged Lecourbe to leave his retirement and join him.  Now, though Lecourbe was a distinguished General, specially famed for mountain warfare—­witness his services in 1799 among the Alps above Lucerne—­he had been long left unemployed by Napoleon on account of his strong Republican opinions and his sympathy with Moreau.  These two Generals, Bourmont and Lecourbe, the two arms of Ney as commander, through whom alone he could communicate with the troops, he not only kept with him, but consulted to the last, before he declared for Napoleon.  This would have been too dangerous a thing for a tricky politician