Even now I am filled with astonishment when I think of the Council that was held at the Tuileries on the evening of the 13th of March in M. de Blacas’ apartments.  The ignorance of the members of that Council respecting our situation, and their confidence in the useless measures they had adopted against Napoleon, exceed all conception.

Will it be believed that those great statesmen, who had the control of the telegraph, the post-office, the police and its agents, money-in short, everything which constitutes power—­asked me to give them information respecting the advance of Bonaparte?  What could I say to them?  I could only repeat the reports which were circulated on the Exchange, and those which I had collected here and there during the last twenty-four hours.  I did not conceal that the danger was imminent, and that all their precautions would be of no avail.  The question then arose as to what course should be adapted by the King.  It was impossible that the monarch could remain at the Capital, and yet, where was he to go?  One proposed that he should go to Bordeaux, another to La Vendee, and a third to Normandy, and a fourth member of the Council was of opinion that the King should be conducted to Melun.  I conceived that if a battle should take place anywhere it would probably be in the neighbourhood of that town, but the councillor who made this last suggestion assured us that the presence of the King in an open carriage and eight horses would produce a wonderful effect on the minds of the troops.  This project was merely ridiculous; the others appeared to be dangerous and impracticable.  I declared to the Council that, considering the situation of things, it was necessary to renounce all idea of resistance by force of arms; that no soldier would fire a musket, and that it was madness to attempt to take any other view of things.  “Defection,” said I, “is inevitable.  The soldiers are drinking in their barracks the money which you have been giving them for some days past to purchase their fidelity.  They say Louis XVIII., is a very decent sort of man, but ‘Vive le petit Caporal!’”

Immediately on the landing of Napoleon the King sent an extraordinary courier to Marmont, who was at Chatillon whither he had gone to take a last leave of his dying mother.  I saw him one day after he had had an interview with the King; I think it was on the 6th or 7th of March.  After some conversation on the landing of Napoleon, and the means of preventing him from reaching Paris, Marmont said to me, “This is what I dwelt most strongly upon in the interview I have just had with the King.  ‘Sire,’ said I, ’I doubt not Bonaparte’s intention of coming to Paris, and the best way to prevent him doing so would be for your Majesty to remain here.  It is necessary to secure the Palace of the Tuileries against a surprise, and to prepare it for resisting a siege, in which it would be indispensable to use cannon.  You must shut yourself up in your palace, with the individuals of your household and the principal public functionaries, while the Due d’Angoulome should go to Bordeaux, the Duc de Berri to La Vendee, and Monsieur to, the Franche-Comte; but they must set off in open day, and announce that they are going to collect defenders for your Majesty.—­[Monsieur, the brother of the King, the Comte d’Artois later Charles X.]