In January 1812 Davoust invaded Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any apparent motive.  Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country?  That was impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him.  He rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.

The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened his States.  Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with the Prince-Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their interests.  I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland.  He even went so far as to hint that hernadotte might supersede Napoleon.  Bernadotte adopted all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made common cause against Napoleon.  The Prince Royal’s conduct has been much blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political interest.  Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance of an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his formidable neighbour, his protector in Sweden, and where hostility might effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus?  Sweden, in joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of England.  Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade and even her existence?

CHAPTER XXVII.

1812.

Changeableness of Bonaparte’s plans and opinions—­Articles for the ‘Moniteur’ dictated by the First Consul—­The Protocol of the Congress of Chatillon—­Conversations with Davoust at Hamburg—­ Promise of the Viceroyalty of Poland—­Hope and disappointment of the Poles—­Influence of illusion on Bonaparte—­The French in Moscow—­ Disasters of the retreat—­Mallet’s conspiracy—­Intelligence of the affair communicated to Napoleon at Smolensko—­Circumstances detailed by Rapp—­Real motives of Napoleon’s return to Paris—­Murat, Ney, and Eugene—­Power of the Italians to endure cold—­Napoleon’s exertions to repair his losses—­Defection of General York—­Convocation of a Privy Council—­War resolved on—­Wavering of the Pope—­Useless negotiations with Vienna—­Maria Louisa appointed Regent.

It may now he asked whether Bonaparte, previous to entering upon the last campaign, had resolved on restoring Poland to independence.  The fact is that Bonaparte, as Emperor, never entertained any positive wish to