During these communications with Austria M. Otto was in London negotiating for the exchange of prisoners.  England would not hear of an armistice by sea like that which France had concluded with Austria by land.  She alleged that, in case of a rupture, France would derive from that armistice greater advantage than Austria would gain by that already concluded.  The difficulty and delay attending the necessary communications rendered these reasons plausible.  The First Consul consented to accept other propositions from England, and to allow her to take part in the discussions of Luneville, but on condition that she should sign a treaty with him without the intervention of Austria.  This England refused to do.  Weary of this uncertainty, and the tergiversation of Austria, which was still under the influence of England, and feeling that the prolongation of such a state of things could only turn to his disadvantage, Bonaparte broke the armistice.  He had already consented to sacrifices which his successes in Italy did not justify.  The hope of an immediate peace had alone made him lose sight of the immense advantages which victory had given him.

Far from appearing sensible to the many proofs of moderation which the First Consul evinced, the combined insolence of England and Austria seemed only to increase.  Orders were immediately given for resuming the offensive in Germany and Italy, and hostilities then recommenced.

The chances of fortune were long doubtful.  After a reverse Austria made promises, and after an advantage she evaded them; but finally, fortune proved favourable to France.  The French armies in Italy and Germany crossed the Mincio and the Danube, and the celebrated battle of Hohenlinden brought the French advanced posts within ten leagues of Vienna.  This victory secured peace; for, profiting by past experience, the First Consul would not hear of any suspension of arms until Austria should consent to a separate treaty.  Driven into her last intrenchments, Austria was obliged to yield.  She abandoned England; and the English Cabinet, in spite of the subsidy of 2,000,000 sterling, consented to the separation.  Great Britain was forced to come to this arrangement in consequence of the situation to which the successes of the army of Moreau had reduced Austria, which it was certain would be ruined by longer resistance.

England wished to enter into negotiations at Luneville.  To this the First Consul acceded; but, as he saw that England was seeking to deceive him, he required that she should suspend hostilities with France, as Austria had done.  Bonaparte very reasonably alleged that an indefinite armistice on the Continent would be more to the disadvantage of France than a long armistice by sea would be unfavourable to England.  All this adjourned the preliminaries to 1801 and the peace to 1802.

The impatience and indignation of the First Consul had been highly excited by the evasions of Austria and the plots of England, for he knew all the intrigues that were carrying on for the restoration of the Bourbons.  His joy may be therefore conceived when the battle of Hohenlinden balanced the scale of fortune in his favour.  On the 3d of December 1800 Moreau gained that memorable victory which at length put an end to the hesitations of the Cabinet of Vienna.