—­[Joseph Bonaparte fairly enough remarks on this that such writings had done great harm in those extraordinary times (Erreurs, tome i, p. 259).  Metternich, writing in 1827 with distrust of the proceedings of Louis XVIII., quotes, with approval, Napoleon’s sentiments on this point.  “Napoleon, who could not have been wanting in the feeling of power, said to me, ’You see me master of Prance; well, I would not, undertake to govern her for three months with liberty of the press.  Louis XVIII., apparently thinking himself stronger than Napoleon, is not content with allowing the press its freedom, but has embodied its liberty in the charter” (Metternich, tome iv, p. 391.)]—­

CHAPTER XXXII.

1800.

Successful management of parties—­Precautions—­Removal from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries—­Hackney-coaches and the Consul’s white horses—­Royal custom and an inscription—­The review—­Bonaparte’s homage to the standards—­Talleyrand in Bonaparte’s cabinet—­ Bonaparte’s aversion to the cap of liberty even in painting—­The state bed—­Our cabinet.

Of the three brothers to whom the 18th Brumaire gave birth Bonaparte speedily declared himself the eldest, and hastened to assume all the rights of primogeniture.  He soon arrogated to himself the whole power.  The project he had formed, when he favoured the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, was now about to be realized.  It was then an indispensable part of his plan that the Directory should violate the constitution in order to justify a subsequent subversion of the Directory.  The expressions which escaped him from time to time plainly showed that his ambition was not yet satisfied, and that the Consulship was only a state of probation preliminary to the complete establishment of monarchy.  The Luxembourg was then discovered to be too small for the Chief of the Government, and it was resolved that Bonaparte should inhabit the Tuileries.  Still great prudence was necessary to avoid the quicksands which surrounded him!  He therefore employed great precaution in dealing with the susceptibilities of the Republicans, taking care to inure them gradually to the temperature of absolute power.  But this mode of treatment was not sufficient; for such was Bonaparte’s situation between the Jacobins and the Royalists that he could not strike a blow at one party without strengthening the other.  He, however, contrived to solve this difficult problem, and weakened both parties by alternately frightening each.  “You see, Royalists,” he seemed to say, “if you do not attach yourselves to my government the Jacobins will again rise and bring back the reign of terror and its scaffold.”  To the men of the Revolution he, on the other hand, said, “See, the counter-Revolution appears, threatening reprisals and vengeance.  It is ready to overwhelm you; my buckler can alone protect you from its attacks.”  Thus both parties were induced, from their mutual fear of each other, to attach themselves to Bonaparte; and while they fancied they were only placing themselves under the protection of the Chief of the Government, they were making themselves dependent on an ambitious man, who, gradually bending them to his will, guided them as he chose in his political career.  He advanced with a firm step; but he never neglected any artifice to conceal, as long as possible, his designs.