Had our attack on St. Jean d’Acre been less precipitate, and had the siege been undertaken according to the rules of war; the place would not have held out three days; one assault, like that of the 8th of May, would have been sufficient.  If, in the situation in which we were on the day when we first came in sight of the ramparts of Acre; we had made a less inconsiderate estimate of the strength of the place; if we had likewise taken into consideration the active co-operation of the English and the Ottoman Porte; our absolute want of artillery of sufficient calibre; our scarcity of gunpowder and the difficulty of procuring food; we certainly should not have undertaken the siege; and that would have been by far the wisest course.

Towards the end of the siege the General-in-Chief received intelligence of some trifling insurrections in northern Egypt.  An angel had excited them, and the heavenly messenger, who had condescended to assume a name, was called the Mahdi, or El Mohdy.  This religious extravagance, however, did not last long, and tranquillity was soon restored.  All that the fanatic Mahdi, who shrouded himself in mystery, succeeded in doing was to attack our rear by some vagabonds, whose illusions were dissipated by a few musket shots.

CHAPTER XIX.

1799.

The siege of Acre raised—­Attention to names is bulletins—­Gigantic project—­The Druses—­Mount Caramel—­The wounded and infected—­ Order to march on foot—­Loss of our cannon—­A Nablousian fires at Bonaparte—­Return to Jaffa—­Bonaparte visits the plague hospital—­ A potion given to the sick—­Bonaparte’s statement at St. Helena.

The siege of St. Jean d’Acre was raised on the 20th of May.  It cost us a loss of nearly 3000 men, in killed, deaths by the plague, or wounds.  A great number were wounded mortally.  In those veracious documents, the bulletins, the French loss was made 500 killed, and 1000 wounded, and the enemy’s more than 15,000.

Our bulletins may form curious materials for history; but their value certainly will not depend on the credit due to their details.  Bonaparte attached the greatest importance to those documents; generally drawing them up himself, or correcting them, when written by another hand, if the composition did not please him.

It must be confessed that at that time nothing so much flattered self-love as being mentioned in a bulletin.  Bonaparte was well aware of this; he knew that to insert a name in a bulletin was conferring a great honour, and that its exclusion was a severe disappointment.  General Berthier, to whom I had expressed a strong desire to examine the works of the siege, took me over them; but notwithstanding his promise of secrecy; he mentioned the circumstance to the General-in-Chief, who had desired me not to approach the works.  “What did you go there for?” said Bonaparte to me, with some severity; “that is not your