an end to the sufferings of these unfortunate beings, unshortened by any sacrifice.  All this is incorrect.  No rear-guard was left—­it could not be done.  Pretence is made of forgetting that the ramparts were destroyed, that the town—­was as open and as defenceless as any village, so this small rear-guard would have been left for certain destruction.  The dates themselves tell against these suppositions.  It is certain, as can be seen by the official account, that we arrived at Jaffa on 24th May, and stayed there the 25th, 26th, and 27th.  We left it on the 28th.  Thus the rear-guard, which, according to these writers; left-on the 29th, did not remain, even according to their own hypothesis, three days after the army to see the sick die.  In reality it left on the 29th of May, the day after we did:  Here are the very words of the Major-General (Berthier) in his official account, written under the eye and under the dictation of the Commander-in-Chief:—­

The army arrived at Jaffa, 5th Prairial (24th May), and remained there the 6th, 7th, and 8th (25th-27th May).  This time was employed in punishing the village, which had behaved badly.  The fortifications of Jaffa were blown up.  All the iron guns of the place were thrown into the sea.  The wounded were removed by sea and by land.  There were only a few ships, and to give time to complete the evacuation by land, the departure of the army had to be deferred until the 9th (28th May).  Klebers division formed the rear-guard, and only left Jaffa, on the 10th (29th May).

The official report of what passed at Jaffa was drawn up by Berthier, under the eye of Bonaparte.  It has been published; but it may be remarked that not a word about the infected, not a word of the visit to the hospital, or the touching of the plague-patients with impunity, is there mentioned.  In no official report is anything said about the matter.  Why this silence?  Bonaparte was not the man to conceal a fact which would have afforded him so excellent and so allowable a text for talking about his fortune.  If the infected were removed, why not mention it?  Why be silent on so important an event?  But it would have been necessary to confess that being obliged to have recourse to so painful a measure was the unavoidable consequence of this unfortunate expedition.  Very disagreeable details must have been entered into; and it was thought more advisable to be silent on the subject.

But what did Napoleon, himself say on the subject at St. Helena?  His statement there was to the following, effect:—­“I ordered a consultation as to what was best to be done.  The report which was made stated that there were seven or eight men (the question is not about the number) so dangerously ill that they could not live beyond twenty-four hours, and would besides infect the rest of the army with the plague.  It was thought it would be an act of charity to anticipate their death a few, hours.”