When I went into politics, New York City was under the control of Tammany, which was from time to time opposed by some other—­and evanescent—­city Democratic organization.  The up-country Democrats had not yet fallen under Tammany sway, and were on the point of developing a big country political boss in the shape of David B. Hill.  The Republican party was split into the Stalwart and Half-Breed factions.  Accordingly neither party had one dominant boss, or one dominant machine, each being controlled by jarring and warring bosses and machines.  The corruption was not what it had been in the days of Tweed, when outside individuals controlled the legislators like puppets.  Nor was there any such centralization of the boss system as occurred later.  Many of the members were under the control of local bosses or local machines.  But the corrupt work was usually done through the members directly.

Of course I never had anything in the nature of legal proof of corruption, and the figures I am about to give are merely approximate.  But three years’ experience convinced me, in the first place, that there were a great many thoroughly corrupt men in the Legislature, perhaps a third of the whole number; and, in the next place, that the honest men outnumbered the corrupt men, and that, if it were ever possible to get an issue of right and wrong put vividly and unmistakably before them in a way that would arrest their attention and that would arrest the attention of their constituents, we could count on the triumph of the right.  The trouble was that in most cases the issue was confused.  To read some kinds of literature one would come to the conclusion that the only corruption in legislative circles was in the form of bribery by corporations, and that the line was sharp between the honest man who was always voting against corporations and the dishonest man who was always bribed to vote for them.  My experience was the direct contrary of this.  For every one bill introduced (not passed) corruptly to favor a corporation, there were at least ten introduced (not passed, and in this case not intended to be passed) to blackmail corporations.  The majority of the corrupt members would be found voting for the blackmailing bills if they were not paid, and would also be found voting in the interests of the corporation if they were paid.  The blackmailing, or, as they were always called, the “strike” bills, could themselves be roughly divided into two categories:  bills which it would have been proper to pass, and those that it would not have been proper to pass.  Some of the bills aimed at corporations were utterly wild and improper; and of these a proportion might be introduced by honest and foolish zealots, whereas most of them were introduced by men who had not the slightest intention of passing them, but who wished to be paid not to pass them.  The most profitable type of bill to the accomplished blackmailer, however, was a bill aimed at a real corporate abuse which the