whatever which they wished to give up.  I also pointed out that in my judgment whereas the Japanese had enjoyed the sympathy of most of the civilized powers at the outset of and during the continuance of the war, they would forfeit it if they turned the war into one merely for getting money—­and, moreover, they would almost certainly fail to get the money, and would simply find themselves at the end of a year, even if things prospered with them, in possession of territory they did not want, having spent enormous additional sums of money, and lost enormous additional numbers of men, and yet without a penny of remuneration.  The treaty of peace was finally signed.

As is inevitable under such circumstances, each side felt that it ought to have got better terms; and when the danger was well past each side felt that it had been over-reached by the other, and that if the war had gone on it would have gotten more than it actually did get.  The Japanese Government had been wise throughout, except in the matter of announcing that it would insist on a money indemnity.  Neither in national nor in private affairs is it ordinarily advisable to make a bluff which cannot be put through—­personally, I never believe in doing it under any circumstances.  The Japanese people had been misled by this bluff of their Government; and the unwisdom of the Government’s action in the matter was shown by the great resentment the treaty aroused in Japan, although it was so beneficial to Japan.  There were various mob outbreaks, especially in the Japanese cities; the police were roughly handled, and several Christian churches were burned, as reported to me by the American Minister.  In both Russia and Japan I believe that the net result as regards myself was a feeling of injury, and of dislike of me, among the people at large.  I had expected this; I regarded it as entirely natural; and I did not resent it in the least.  The Governments of both nations behaved toward me not only with correct and entire propriety, but with much courtesy and the fullest acknowledgment of the good effect of what I had done; and in Japan, at least, I believe that the leading men sincerely felt that I had been their friend.  I had certainly tried my best to be the friend not only of the Japanese people but of the Russian people, and I believe that what I did was for the best interests of both and of the world at large.

During the course of the negotiations I tried to enlist the aid of the Governments of one nation which was friendly to Russia, and of another nation which was friendly to Japan, in helping bring about peace.  I got no aid from either.  I did, however, receive aid from the Emperor of Germany.  His Ambassador at St. Petersburg was the one Ambassador who helped the American Ambassador, Mr. Meyer, at delicate and doubtful points of the negotiations.  Mr. Meyer, who was, with the exception of Mr. White, the most useful diplomat in the American service, rendered literally invaluable aid by insisting upon himself seeing the Czar at critical periods of the transaction, when it was no longer possible for me to act successfully through the representatives of the Czar, who were often at cross purposes with one another.