of which the American members were Senators Lodge and Turner, and Secretary Root, we were able peacefully to settle the Alaska Boundary question, the only question remaining between ourselves and the British Empire which it was not possible to settle by friendly arbitration; this therefore represented the removal of the last obstacle to absolute agreement between the two peoples.  We were of substantial service in bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the negotiations at Algeciras concerning Morocco.  We concluded with Great Britain, and with most of the other great nations, arbitration treaties specifically agreeing to arbitrate all matters, and especially the interpretation of treaties, save only as regards questions affecting territorial integrity, national honor and vital national interest.  We made with Great Britain a treaty guaranteeing the free use of the Panama Canal on equal terms to the ships of all nations, while reserving to ourselves the right to police and fortify the canal, and therefore to control it in time of war.  Under this treaty we are in honor bound to arbitrate the question of canal tolls for coastwise traffic between the Western and Eastern coasts of the United States.  I believe that the American position as regards this matter is right; but I also believe that under the arbitration treaty we are in honor bound to submit the matter to arbitration in view of Great Britain’s contention—­although I hold it to be an unwise contention—­that our position is unsound.  I emphatically disbelieve in making universal arbitration treaties which neither the makers nor any one else would for a moment dream of keeping.  I no less emphatically insist that it is our duty to keep the limited and sensible arbitration treaties which we have already made.  The importance of a promise lies not in making it, but in keeping it; and the poorest of all positions for a nation to occupy in such a matter is readiness to make impossible promises at the same time that there is failure to keep promises which have been made, which can be kept, and which it is discreditable to break.

During the early part of the year 1905, the strain on the civilized world caused by the Russo-Japanese War became serious.  The losses of life and of treasure were frightful.  From all the sources of information at hand, I grew most strongly to believe that a further continuation of the struggle would be a very bad thing for Japan, and an even worse thing for Russia.  Japan was already suffering terribly from the drain upon her men, and especially upon her resources, and had nothing further to gain from continuance of the struggle; its continuance meant to her more loss than gain, even if she were victorious.  Russia, in spite of her gigantic strength, was, in my judgment, apt to lose even more than she had already lost if the struggle continued.  I deemed it probable that she would no more be able successfully to defend Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria than she had