not.  There is, however, one consideration upon which we should insist.  Either we should retain complete control of the islands, or absolve ourselves from all responsibility for them.  Any half and half course would be both foolish and disastrous.  We are governing and have been governing the islands in the interests of the Filipinos themselves.  If after due time the Filipinos themselves decide that they do not wish to be thus governed, then I trust that we will leave; but when we do leave it must be distinctly understood that we retain no protectorate—­and above all that we take part in no joint protectorate—­over the islands, and give them no guarantee, of neutrality or otherwise; that, in short, we are absolutely quit of responsibility for them, of every kind and description.

The Filipinos were quite incapable of standing by themselves when we took possession of the islands, and we had made no promise concerning them.  But we had explicitly promised to leave the island of Cuba, had explicitly promised that Cuba should be independent.  Early in my administration that promise was redeemed.  When the promise was made, I doubt if there was a single ruler or diplomat in Europe who believed that it would be kept.  As far as I know, the United States was the first power which, having made such a promise, kept it in letter and spirit.  England was unwise enough to make such a promise when she took Egypt.  It would have been a capital misfortune to have kept the promise, and England has remained in Egypt for over thirty years, and will unquestionably remain indefinitely; but though it is necessary for her to do so, the fact of her doing so has meant the breaking of a positive promise and has been a real evil.  Japan made the same guarantee about Korea, but as far as can be seen there was never even any thought of keeping the promise in this case; and Korea, which had shown herself utterly impotent either for self-government or self-defense, was in actual fact almost immediately annexed to Japan.

We made the promise to give Cuba independence; and we kept the promise.  Leonard Wood was left in as Governor for two or three years, and evolved order out of chaos, raising the administration of the island to a level, moral and material, which it had never before achieved.  We also by treaty gave the Cubans substantial advantages in our markets.  Then we left the island, turning the government over to its own people.  After four or five years a revolution broke out, during my administration, and we again had to intervene to restore order.  We promptly sent thither a small army of pacification.  Under General Barry, order was restored and kept, and absolute justice done.  The American troops were then withdrawn and the Cubans reestablished in complete possession of their own beautiful island, and they are in possession of it now.  There are plenty of occasions in our history when we have shown weakness or inefficiency, and some occasions when we have not been as scrupulous as we should have been as regards the rights of others.  But I know of no action by any other government in relation to a weaker power which showed such disinterested efficiency in rendering service as was true in connection with our intervention in Cuba.