from you and Senator Mitchell quoted therein.
I do not at this time desire to discuss the report
itself, which of course I must submit to the Attorney-General.
But I have been obliged to reach the painful conclusion
that your own letters as therein quoted tend to show
that you recommended for the position of District Attorney
B when you had good reason to believe that he had
himself been guilty of fraudulent conduct; that you
recommended C for the same position simply because
it was for B’s interest that he should be so
recommended, and, as there is reason to believe, because
he had agreed to divide the fees with B if he were
appointed; and that you finally recommended the reappointment
of H with the knowledge that if H were appointed he
would abstain from prosecuting B for criminal misconduct,
this being why B advocated H’s claims for reappointment.
If you care to make any statement in the matter, I
shall of course be glad to hear it. As the District
Judge of Oregon I shall appoint Judge Wolverton.”
In the letter I of course gave in full the names indicated
above by initials. Senator Fulton gave no explanation.
I therefore ceased to consult him about appointments
under the Department of Justice and the Interior,
the two departments in which the crookedness had occurred—there
was no question of crookedness in the other offices
in the State, and they could be handled in the ordinary
manner. Legal proceedings were undertaken against
his colleague in the Senate, and one of his colleagues
in the lower house, and the former was convicted and
sentenced to the penitentiary.
In a number of instances the legality of executive
acts of my Administration was brought before the courts.
They were uniformly sustained. For example, prior
to 1907 statutes relating to the disposition of coal
lands had been construed as fixing the flat price at
$10 to $20 per acre. The result was that valuable
coal lands were sold for wholly inadequate prices,
chiefly to big corporations. By executive order
the coal lands were withdrawn and not opened for entry
until proper classification was placed thereon by
Government agents. There was a great clamor that
I was usurping legislative power; but the acts were
not assailed in court until we brought suits to set
aside entries made by persons and associations to
obtain larger areas than the statutes authorized.
This position was opposed on the ground that the restrictions
imposed were illegal; that the executive orders were
illegal. The Supreme Court sustained the Government.
In the same way our attitude in the water power question
was sustained, the Supreme Court holding that the
Federal Government had the rights we claimed over
streams that are or may be declared navigable by Congress.
Again, when Oklahoma became a State we were obliged
to use the executive power to protect Indian rights
and property, for there had been an enormous amount
of fraud in the obtaining of Indian lands by white
men. Here we were denounced as usurping power
over a State as well as usurping power that did not
belong to the executive. The Supreme Court sustained
our action.