the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.  Under this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the President and the heads of the departments.  I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power.  In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition.  I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the substance.  The Senate at one time objected to my communicating with them in printing, preferring the expensive, foolish, and laborious practice of writing out the messages by hand.  It was not possible to return to the outworn archaism of hand writing; but we endeavored to have the printing made as pretty as possible.  Whether I communicated with the Congress in writing or by word of mouth, and whether the writing was by a machine, or a pen, were equally, and absolutely, unimportant matters.  The importance lay in what I said and in the heed paid to what I said.  So as to my meeting and consulting Senators, Congressmen, politicians, financiers, and labor men.  I consulted all who wished to see me; and if I wished to see any one, I sent for him; and where the consultation took place was a matter of supreme unimportance.  I consulted every man with the sincere hope that I could profit by and follow his advice; I consulted every member of Congress who wished to be consulted, hoping to be able to come to an agreement of action with him; and I always finally acted as my conscience and common sense bade me act.

About appointments I was obliged by the Constitution to consult the Senate; and the long-established custom of the Senate meant that in practice this consultation was with individual Senators and even with big politicians who stood behind the Senators.  I was only one-half the appointing power; I nominated; but the Senate confirmed.  In practice, by what was called “the courtesy of the Senate,” the Senate normally refused to confirm any appointment if the Senator from the State objected to it.  In exceptional cases, where I could arouse public attention, I could force through the appointment in spite of the opposition of the Senators; in all ordinary cases this was impossible.  On the other hand, the Senator could of course do nothing for any man unless I chose to nominate him.  In consequence the Constitution itself forced the President and the Senators from each State to come to a working agreement on the appointments in and from that State.