that city by a rush, and if we have to move out of here at all I should be inclined to make the rush in the right direction.”  Greenway nodded an eager assent.  The old General, after a moment’s pause, expressed his hearty agreement, and said that he would see that there was no falling back.  He had been very sick for a couple of days, but, sick as he was, he managed to get into the fight.  He was a gamecock if ever there was one, but he was in very bad physical shape on the day of the fight.  If there had been any one in high command to supervise and press the attack that afternoon, we would have gone right into Santiago.  In my part of the line the advance was halted only because we received orders not to move forward, but to stay on the crest of the captured hill and hold it.

We are always told that three-o’clock-in-the-morning courage is the most desirable kind.  Well, my men and the regulars of the cavalry had just that brand of courage.  At about three o’clock on the morning after the first fight, shooting began in our front and there was an alarm of a Spanish advance.  I was never more pleased than to see the way in which the hungry, tired, shabby men all jumped up and ran forward to the hill-crest, so as to be ready for the attack; which, however, did not come.  As soon as the sun rose the Spaniards again opened upon us with artillery.  A shell burst between Dave Goodrich and myself, blacking us with powder, and killing and wounding several of the men immediately behind us.

Next day the fight turned into a siege; there were some stirring incidents; but for the most part it was trench work.  A fortnight later Santiago surrendered.  Wood won his brigadier-generalship by the capital way in which he handled his brigade in the fight, and in the following siege.  He was put in command of the captured city; and in a few days I succeeded to the command of the brigade.

The health of the troops was not good, and speedily became very bad.  There was some dysentery, and a little yellow fever; but most of the trouble was from a severe form of malarial fever.  The Washington authorities had behaved better than those in actual command of the expedition at one crisis.  Immediately after the first day’s fighting around Santiago the latter had hinted by cable to Washington that they might like to withdraw, and Washington had emphatically vetoed the proposal.  I record this all the more gladly because there were not too many gleams of good sense shown in the home management of the war; although I wish to repeat that the real blame for this rested primarily with us ourselves, the people of the United States, who had for years pursued in military matters a policy that rendered it certain that there would be ineptitude and failure in high places if ever a crisis came.  After the siege the people in Washington showed no knowledge whatever of the conditions around Santiago, and proposed to keep the army there.  This would have meant that at least three-fourths of