Major-general Hooker:
Your letter by the hand of General Butterfield is received, and will be conformed to. The thing you dispense with would have been ready by mid-day to-morrow.
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO ADMIRAL S. P. DUPONT.
Executive Mansion, Washington, April 13, 1863
Admiral Dupont:
Hold your position inside the bar near Charleston; or, if you shall have left it, return to it, and hold it until further orders. Do not allow the enemy to erect new batteries or defenses on Morris Island. If he has begun it, drive him out. I do not herein order you to renew the general attack. That is to depend on your own discretion or a further order.
A. Lincoln.
TO GENERAL D. HUNTER AND ADMIRAL S. F. DUPONT.
Executive Mansion, Washington,
April 54, 1863.
General Hunter and admiral Dupont:
This is intended to clear up an apparent inconsistency between the recent order to continue operations before Charleston and the former one to remove to another point in a certain contingency. No censure upon you, or either of you, is intended. We still hope that by cordial and judicious co-operation you can take the batteries on Morris Island and Sullivan’s Island and Fort Sumter. But whether you can or not, we wish the demonstration kept up for a time, for a collateral and very important object. We wish the attempt to be a real one, though not a desperate one, if it affords any considerable chance of success. But if prosecuted as a demonstration only, this must not become public, or the whole effect will be lost. Once again before Charleston, do not leave until further orders from here. Of course this is not intended to force you to leave unduly exposed Hilton Head or other near points in your charge.
Yours truly,
A. Lincoln.
P. S.—Whoever receives this first, please send a copy to the other immediately. A.L.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL S. HOOKER.
Washington, D. C., April 15, 1863. 10.15 P.M.
Major-general Hooker:
It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud of course were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross, and will be hindered by the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious.