A. Lincoln.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.

War department, October 11,1862. 4 P.M.

General Boyle, Louisville, Kentucky: 

Please send any news you have from General Buell to-day.

A. Lincoln.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.

War department, October 12, 1862. 4.10 P.M.

General Boyle, Louisville, Kentucky: 

We are anxious to hear from General Buell’s army.  We have heard nothing since day before yesterday.  Have you anything?

A. Lincoln.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL CURTIS.

Washington, D. C., October 12, 1862.

Major-general Curtis, Saint Louis, Missouri: 

Would the completion of the railroad some distance further in the direction of Springfield, Mo., be of any military advantage to you?  Please answer.

A. Lincoln.

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

Executive Mansion, Washington,
October 13, 1862.

My dear sir—­You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness.  Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing?  Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper’s Ferry to that point be put in working order.  But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named.  He now wagons from Culpepper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper’s Ferry.  He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are.  I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper’s Perry to Winchester; but it wastes an the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.

Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is “to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible, without exposing your own.”  You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor.  Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours?  You dread his going into Pennsylvania.  But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.