That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.

Abraham Lincoln.

TO SECRETARY STANTON,

Executive Mansion Washington, January 31, 1862

Hon.  Secretary of war.

My dear sir:—­It is my wish that the expedition commonly called the “Lane Expedition” shall be, as much as has been promised at the adjutant-general’s office, under the supervision of General McClellan, and not any more.  I have not intended, and do not now intend, that it shall be a great, exhausting affair, but a snug, sober column of 10,000 or 15,000.  General Lane has been told by me many times that he is under the command of General Hunter, and assented to it as often as told.  It was the distinct agreement between him and me, when I appointed him, that he was to be under Hunter.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln.

PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

Executive Mansion, Washington, January 31, 1862.

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

Abraham Lincoln.

OPPOSITION TO McCLELLAN’S PLANS

To general G. B. McCLELLAN,

Executive Mansion, Washington, February 3, 1862.

Major-general MCCLELLAN.

Dear sir—­You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—­yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

First.  Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second.  Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third.  Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth.  In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy’s communications, while mine would?