This city and most of the middle and northern counties are insurrectionary,—­burning bridges, destroying telegraph lines, etc.,—­and can be kept down only by the presence of troops.  A large portion of the foreign troops organized by General Fremont are unreliable; indeed, many of them are already mutinous.  They have been tampered with by politicians, and made to believe that if they get up a mutiny and demand Fremont’s return the government will be forced to restore him to duty here.  It is believed that some high officers are in the plot I have already been obliged to disarm several of these organizations, and I am daily expecting more serious outbreaks.  Another grave difficulty is the want of proper general officers to command the troops and enforce order and discipline, and especially to protect public property from robbery and plunder.  Some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command.  I assure you, Mr. President, it is very difficult to accomplish much with such means.  I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull axe, a broken saw, and rotten timber.  It is true that I have some very good green timber, which will answer the purpose as soon as I can get it into shape and season it a little.

I know nothing of General Buell’s intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign.  If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run.  To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred.  It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read.

General Buell’s army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. Halleck, Major-General

[Indorsement]

The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck.  It is exceedingly discouraging.  As everywhere else, nothing can be done.

A. Lincoln.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.

Washington, D. C., January 11, 1862

Governor John A. Andrew, Boston: 

I will be greatly obliged if you will arrange; somehow with General
Butler to officer his two un-officered regiments.

A. LINCOLN

TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL.

Executive Mansion, Washington, January 13, 1861