I have recently seen a letter of Judge Douglas’s in which, without stating that to be the object, he doubtless endeavors to make a distinction between the two.  He says he is unalterably opposed to the repeal of the laws against the African slave trade.  And why?  He then seeks to give a reason that would not apply to his popular sovereignty in the Territories.  What is that reason?  “The abolition of the African slave trade is a compromise of the Constitution!” I deny it.  There is no truth in the proposition that the abolition of the African slave trade is a compromise of the Constitution.  No man can put his finger on anything in the Constitution, or on the line of history, which shows it.  It is a mere barren assertion, made simply for the purpose of getting up a distinction between the revival of the African slave trade and his “great principle.”

At the time the Constitution of the United States was adopted, it was expected that the slave trade would be abolished.  I should assert and insist upon that, if judge Douglas denied it.  But I know that it was equally expected that slavery would be excluded from the Territories, and I can show by history that in regard to these two things public opinion was exactly alike, while in regard to positive action, there was more done in the Ordinance of ’87 to resist the spread of slavery than was ever done to abolish the foreign slave trade.  Lest I be misunderstood, I say again that at the time of the formation of the Constitution, public expectation was that the slave trade would be abolished, but no more so than the spread of slavery in the Territories should be restrained.  They stand alike, except that in the Ordinance of ’87 there was a mark left by public opinion, showing that it was more committed against the spread of slavery in the Territories than against the foreign slave trade.

Compromise!  What word of compromise was there about it?  Why, the public sense was then in favor of the abolition of the slave trade; but there was at the time a very great commercial interest involved in it, and extensive capital in that branch of trade.  There were doubtless the incipient stages of improvement in the South in the way of farming, dependent on the slave trade, and they made a proposition to Congress to abolish the trade after allowing it twenty years,—­a sufficient time for the capital and commerce engaged in it to be transferred to other channel.  They made no provision that it should be abolished in twenty years; I do not doubt that they expected it would be, but they made no bargain about it.  The public sentiment left no doubt in the minds of any that it would be done away.  I repeat, there is nothing in the history of those times in favor of that matter being a compromise of the constitution.  It was the public expectation at the time, manifested in a thousand ways, that the spread of slavery should also be restricted.