Or it might be a sort of exclusion of him from the
lot if you were to kill him and let the worms devour
him; but neither of these things is the same as “controlling
him as other property.” That would be to
feed him, to pamper him, to ride him, to use and abuse
him, to make the most money out of him, “as other
property”; but, please you, what do the men who
are in favor of slavery want more than this?
What do they really want, other than that slavery,
being in the Territories, shall be controlled as other
property? If they want anything else, I do not
comprehend it. I ask your attention to this,
first, for the purpose of pointing out the change of
ground the judge has made; and, in the second place,
the importance of the change,—that that
change is not such as to give you gentlemen who want
his popular sovereignty the power to exclude the institution
or drive it out at all. I know the judge sometimes
squints at the argument that in controlling it as
other property by unfriendly legislation they may control
it to death; as you might, in the case of a horse,
perhaps, feed him so lightly and ride him so much
that he would die. But when you come to legislative
control, there is something more to be attended to.
I have no doubt, myself, that if the Territories should
undertake to control slave property as other property
that is, control it in such a way that it would be
the most valuable as property, and make it bear its
just proportion in the way of burdens as property,
really deal with it as property,—the Supreme
Court of the United States will say, “God speed
you, and amen.” But I undertake to give
the opinion, at least, that if the Territories attempt
by any direct legislation to drive the man with his
slave out of the Territory, or to decide that his slave
is free because of his being taken in there, or to
tax him to such an extent that he cannot keep him
there, the Supreme Court will unhesitatingly decide
all such legislation unconstitutional, as long as that
Supreme Court is constructed as the Dred Scott Supreme
Court is. The first two things they have already
decided, except that there is a little quibble among
lawyers between the words “dicta” and
“decision.” They have already decided
a negro cannot be made free by Territorial legislation.
What is the Dred Scott decision? Judge Douglas
labors to show that it is one thing, while I think
it is altogether different. It is a long opinion,
but it is all embodied in this short statement:
“The Constitution of the United States forbids
Congress to deprive a man of his property, without
due process of law; the right of property in slaves
is distinctly and expressly affirmed in that Constitution:
therefore, if Congress shall undertake to say that
a man’s slave is no longer his slave when he
crosses a certain line into a Territory, that is depriving
him of his property without due process of law, and
is unconstitutional.” There is the whole
Dred Scott decision. They add that if Congress
cannot do so itself, Congress cannot confer any power
to do so; and hence any effort by the Territorial
Legislature to do either of these things is absolutely
decided against. It is a foregone conclusion by
that court.