of gradual emancipation which you pretend you would be glad to see succeed.  Now, I will bring you to the test.  After a hard fight they were beaten, and when the news came over here, you threw up your hats and hurrahed for Democracy.  More than that, take all the argument made in favor of the system you have proposed, and it carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in the institution of slavery.  The arguments to sustain that policy carefully exclude it.  Even here to-day you heard Judge Douglas quarrel with me because I uttered a wish that it might sometime come to an end.  Although Henry Clay could say he wished every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors, I am denounced by those pretending to respect Henry Clay for uttering a wish that it might sometime, in some peaceful way, come to an end.  The Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the merest breath, the slightest hint, of the least degree of wrong about it.  Try it by some of Judge Douglas’s arguments.  He says he “don’t care whether it is voted up or voted down” in the Territories.  I do not care myself, in dealing with that expression, whether it is intended to be expressive of his individual sentiments on the subject, or only of the national policy he desires to have established.  It is alike valuable for my purpose.  Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in slavery; but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it, because no man can logically say he don’t care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down.  He may say he don’t care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing.  He contends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them.  So they have, if it is not a wrong.  But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong.  He says that upon the score of equality slaves should be allowed to go in a new Territory, like other property.  This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property.  If it and other property are equal, this argument is entirely logical.  But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong.  You may turn over everything in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxim-like arguments,—­it everywhere carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in it.