effect when it is altogether untrue.  If you come forward with my note for one hundred dollars when I have never given such a note, there is a forgery.  If you come forward with a letter purporting to be written by me which I never wrote, there is another forgery.  If you produce anything in writing or in print saying it is so and so, the document not being genuine, a forgery has been committed.  How do you make this forgery when every piece of the evidence is genuine?  If Judge Douglas does say these documents and quotations are false and forged, he has a full right to do so; but until he does it specifically, we don’t know how to get at him.  If he does say they are false and forged, I will then look further into it, and presume I can procure the certificates of the proper officers that they are genuine copies.  I have no doubt each of these extracts will be found exactly where Trumbull says it is.  Then I leave it to you if Judge Douglas, in making his sweeping charge that Judge Trumbull’s evidence is forged from beginning to end, at all meets the case,—­if that is the way to get at the facts.  I repeat again, if he will point out which one is a forgery, I will carefully examine it, and if it proves that any one of them is really a forgery, it will not be me who will hold to it any longer.  I have always wanted to deal with everyone I meet candidly and honestly.  If I have made any assertion not warranted by facts, and it is pointed out to me, I will withdraw it cheerfully.  But I do not choose to see Judge Trumbull calumniated, and the evidence he has brought forward branded in general terms “a forgery from beginning to end.”  This is not the legal way of meeting a charge, and I submit it to all intelligent persons, both friends of Judge Douglas and of myself, whether it is.

The point upon Judge Douglas is this:  The bill that went into his hands had the provision in it for a submission of the constitution to the people; and I say its language amounts to an express provision for a submission, and that he took the provision out.  He says it was known that the bill was silent in this particular; but I say, Judge Douglas, it was not silent when you got it.  It was vocal with the declaration, when you got it, for a submission of the constitution to the people.  And now, my direct question to Judge Douglas is, to answer why, if he deemed the bill silent on this point, he found it necessary to strike out those particular harmless words.  If he had found the bill silent and without this provision, he might say what he does now.  If he supposes it was implied that the constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people, how could these two lines so encumber the statute as to make it necessary to strike them out?  How could he infer that a submission was still implied, after its express provision had been stricken from the bill?  I find the bill vocal with the provision, while he silenced it.  He took it out, and although he took out the other