[It almost a natural law that, when dead—­no matter how bad we were—­we are automatically beatified.]

When that Compromise was made it did not repeal the old Missouri Compromise.  It left a region of United States territory half as large as the present territory of the United States, north of the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, in which slavery was prohibited by Act of Congress.  This Compromise did not repeal that one.  It did not affect or propose to repeal it.  But at last it became Judge Douglas’s duty, as he thought (and I find no fault with him), as Chairman of the Committee on Territories, to bring in a bill for the organization of a territorial government,—­first of one, then of two Territories north of that line.  When he did so, it ended in his inserting a provision substantially repealing the Missouri Compromise.  That was because the Compromise of 1850 had not repealed it.  And now I ask why he could not have let that Compromise alone?  We were quiet from the agitation of the slavery question.  We were making no fuss about it.  All had acquiesced in the Compromise measures of 1850.  We never had been seriously disturbed by any Abolition agitation before that period.  When he came to form governments for the Territories north of the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, why could he not have let that matter stand as it was standing?  Was it necessary to the organization of a Territory?  Not at all.  Iowa lay north of the line, and had been organized as a Territory and come into the Union as a State without disturbing that Compromise.  There was no sort of necessity for destroying it to organize these Territories.  But, gentlemen, it would take up all my time to meet all the little quibbling arguments of Judge Douglas to show that the Missouri Compromise was repealed by the Compromise of 1850.  My own opinion is, that a careful investigation of all the arguments to sustain the position that that Compromise was virtually repealed by the Compromise of 1850 would show that they are the merest fallacies.  I have the report that Judge Douglas first brought into Congress at the time of the introduction of the Nebraska Bill, which in its original form did not repeal the Missouri Compromise, and he there expressly stated that he had forborne to do so because it had not been done by the Compromise of 1850.  I close this part of the discussion on my part by asking him the question again, “Why, when we had peace under the Missouri Compromise, could you not have let it alone?”

In complaining of what I said in my speech at Springfield, in which he says I accepted my nomination for the senatorship (where, by the way, he is at fault, for if he will examine it, he will find no acceptance in it), he again quotes that portion in which I said that “a house divided against itself cannot stand.”  Let me say a word in regard to that matter.