very well knew they insisted on that which he would not for a moment think of doing, and that they were only bluffing him.  I believe (I have not, since he made his answer, had a chance to examine the journals or Congressional Globe and therefore speak from memory)—­I believe the state of the bill at that time, according to parliamentary rules, was such that no member could propose an additional amendment to Chase’s amendment.  I rather think this is the truth,—­the Judge shakes his head.  Very well.  I would like to know, then, if they wanted Chase’s amendment fixed over, why somebody else could not have offered to do it?  If they wanted it amended, why did they not offer the amendment?  Why did they not put it in themselves?  But to put it on the other ground:  suppose that there was such an amendment offered, and Chase’s was an amendment to an amendment; until one is disposed of by parliamentary law, you cannot pile another on.  Then all these gentlemen had to do was to vote Chase’s on, and then, in the amended form in which the whole stood, add their own amendment to it, if they wanted to put it in that shape.  This was all they were obliged to do, and the ayes and noes show that there were thirty-six who voted it down, against ten who voted in favor of it.  The thirty-six held entire sway and control.  They could in some form or other have put that bill in the exact shape they wanted.  If there was a rule preventing their amending it at the time, they could pass that, and then, Chase’s amendment being merged, put it in the shape they wanted.  They did not choose to do so, but they went into a quibble with Chase to get him to add what they knew he would not add, and because he would not, they stand upon the flimsy pretext for voting down what they argued was the meaning and intent of their own bill.  They left room thereby for this Dred Scott decision, which goes very far to make slavery national throughout the United States.

I pass one or two points I have, because my time will very soon expire; but I must be allowed to say that Judge Douglas recurs again, as he did upon one or two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln, an insignificant individual like Lincoln,—­upon his ipse dixit charging a conspiracy upon a large number of members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery.  I want to say that, in the first place, I have made no charge of this sort upon my ipse dixit.  I have only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it, and presented it to the understanding of others, saying what I think it proves, but giving you the means of judging whether it proves it or not.  This is precisely what I have done.  I have not placed it upon my ipse dixit at all.  On this occasion, I wish to recall his attention to a piece of evidence which I brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing that he had made substantially the same charge against substantially the same persons, excluding his dear self from the category.  I ask him to give some