could they perpetuate slavery in this country!  To my thinking, Judge Douglas is, by his example and vast influence, doing that very thing in this community, when he says that the negro has nothing in the Declaration of Independence.  Henry Clay plainly understood the contrary.  Judge Douglas is going back to the era of our Revolution, and, to the extent of his ability, muzzling the cannon which thunders its annual joyous return.  When he invites any people, willing to have slavery, to establish it, he is blowing out the moral lights around us.  When he says he “cares not whether slavery is voted down or up,”—­that it is a sacred right of self-government,—­he is, in my judgment, penetrating the human soul and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in this American people.  And now I will only say that when, by all these means and appliances, Judge Douglas shall succeed in bringing public sentiment to an exact accordance with his own views; when these vast assemblages shall echo back all these sentiments; when they shall come to repeat his views and to avow his principles, and to say all that he says on these mighty questions,—­then it needs only the formality of the second Dred Scott decision, which he indorses in advance, to make slavery alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.

My friends, that ends the chapter.  The Judge can take his half-hour.

SECOND JOINT DEBATE, AT FREEPORT,

AUGUST 27, 1858

Ladies and gentlemen:—­On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first met in public discussion.  He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and he replied for half an hour.  The order is now reversed.  I am to speak an hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an hour.  I propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of what was brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa.  Of course there was brought within the scope in that half-hour’s speech something of his own opening speech.  In the course of that opening argument Judge Douglas proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories.  In my speech of an hour and a half, I attended to some other parts of his speech, and incidentally, as I thought, intimated to him that I would answer the rest of his interrogatories on condition only that he should agree to answer as many for me.  He made no intimation at the time of the proposition, nor did he in his reply allude at all to that suggestion of mine.  I do him no injustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing with me as though I had refused to answer his interrogatories.  I now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number.  I give him an opportunity to respond.

The Judge remains silent.  I now say that I will answer his interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have done so, I shall propound mine to him.